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Just like France, after its Revolution, had the great 
honour of consecrating in the first of its Constitutions 
the immortal rights of men, so will the Mexican 
Revolution have the legitimate pride to show the world 
that it is the first one to consecrate in a Constitution the 
sacred rights of workers.1 
 




Debate about labour regulation is not new. What is new is the urgency with which labour 
law reform is promoted as an important fix to economic woes. In recent years, calls for 
reform resound in poor and rich countries alike. The economic crisis in the United States 
and in Europe has intensified these debates, making labour regulation a prime target for 
reform. In several US states public sector unions have been under attack, depicted as a 
privileged class that drains public funds with high wages, cosy benefits, and retirement 
privileges that no other workers enjoy. Several European countries have introduced 
austerity measures that target labour regulation and other foundations of the welfare state 
as sources of economic waste that they can no longer afford. Moreover, it is argued that 
“rigid” labour regulation hampers job creation, which can be strengthened through a 
program of labour flexibilisation. 
On the other hand, there is considerable opposition to labour flexibility from labour 
activists and scholars who seek to defend the current structure. They regard today’s job 
stability and benefits as historical achievements and fundamental rights. Defenders of 
labour regulation want to preserve workers’ protections, which they see as the last line of 
defence against enormous pressure from global capital, and resist the flexibility rhetoric, 
which they see as the handmaiden of capital. 
The dire situation of the labour movement worldwide is reflected in the crisis of 
labour law as an academic field. The field is in a state of soul-searching, with scholars 
attempting to determine how labour scholarship can grapple with the defeat of the 
traditional labour movement and with conditions in the global economy that make its 
recovery seem impossible.2  
In this article, I examine two prominent arguments opponents of labour flexibility 
have used to defend labour regulation, that labour regulation: is closely associated with 
the nation’s identity, and is inherently progressive. These arguments have been widely 
used in national debates in countries with strong traditions of social regulation and 
welfare state institutions. Resonances of these argument strands can also be seen in 
                                                
1 Diario de los Debates del Congreso Constituyente, 1916-1917 (Mexico, 1960). 
2 See eg Davidov, Guy and Langille, Brian, eds, The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
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regional debates, such as the debate about “Social Europe” and the future of social 
regulation in the continent in light of further market economic integration.  
This article focuses on the case of Mexico to show both these arguments’ appeal and 
their downsides. Mexico proudly considers itself to be the first country to 
constitutionalize workers’ rights and, for much of its modern life, has seen itself as a 
social state. In the 1980s, however, Mexico introduced an economic liberalization 
program that has had profound effects on its labour market and social security 
institutions. Liberal reformers characterize labour law as a key, pending structural reform 
to help the country get on a path to economic growth. Defenders of labour regulation see 
it as one of the last bastions against an economic model that has thus-far produced 
meagre growth and has increased social and economic inequality.   
Challenging Mexico’s historical narrative, I show how social law was, and still is, a 
truly transnational phenomenon, not necessarily associated with any one nation’s identity. 
In addition, I examine how, even at the moment of its creation, social law was – and still 
is – politically indeterminate and, thus, its inherent association with progressive politics is 
unwarranted. Finally, I argue that the constitutionalization of social rights does not 
guarantee progressive results. These critiques are relevant to the current debate about 
labour regulation in Mexico, where political actors refer to the great achievements of the 
Constitution to defend existing regulation. This defence fails to engage critiques about 
the effects of social regulation on different groups of workers and on the economy in 
general. Social law advocates using these arguments are prone to idealizing existing 
social regulation, making it harder to consider potential alternatives. Ironically, neoliberal 
advocates for labour flexibility have begun to use social law to justify their agenda, 
reinforcing the assertion that social rights are politically indeterminate.  
These insights from Mexico may be relevant to contemporary debates about social 
regulation elsewhere. In particular, I examine the strong parallels between Mexico and 
the debate about social regulation in Europe. In the European Union (EU), the project of 
market economic integration is said to have undermined workers’ rights and social 
entitlements at the national level. Those seeking to advance similar social protections at 
the regional level have done so on identity terms, speaking of “Social Europe” as 
reflecting the continent’s true self in need of institutionalization. These advocates have 
sought to constitutionalize social rights at the European level to ensure those protections. 
At the same time, those who regard further economic integration as a threat resist it on 
identity terms at the national level, seeking to preserve the social protections of the 
welfare state. Both regionally and nationally, resorting to social law is supposed to 
advance progressive aspirations and resist the unfettered march of the market. Relying on 
national –or regional- identity to justify social regulation, however, creates problems 
similar to Mexico: failing to engage arguments about the effects of social law and 
preventing the imagination of alternatives. At this moment of crisis for the euro zone, 
when the monetary union’s viability is being tested, social law discourse has been 
employed by the EU even as it pursues an austerity agenda; this indicates that the 
political valence of this discourse is again in flux.  
The article is divided in three parts. In the first part, I analyze the traditional narrative 
of labour law in Mexico and challenge its historical claims to national identity and 
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progressive politics. I use the case of Mexico, the country that first enshrined workers’ 
rights in a Constitution, as a paradigmatic example of both the appeal and the pitfalls of 
the social law position. I examine the insights that the critique of the traditional narrative 
may contribute to the current debate about labour law in Mexico. In the second part, I 
explore the caveats that the Mexican case may raise for debates about social regulation 
elsewhere, particularly in Europe. I analyze how identity arguments play an important 
role in the concept of “Social Europe” and the regulations or social provisions that are 
assumed to be inherent to the nature of the EU. I will also show how some European 
countries have used a national identity argument to defend their social regulation against 
what they perceived to be a threatening pro-market European Union integration program. 
In the third part, I examine what could be gained by abandoning identity-based arguments 
and, instead, analyzing labour reform as part of a country’s overall development strategy.  
I. The Case of Mexico and Its Labour Regulation  
The reader might not know this, but the idea of social law and the constitutionalization of 
workers’ rights originated in Mexico. Well, not quite. But that is, in a simplified way, the 
traditional narrative in Mexico’s labour law scholarship. The idea of social law emerged 
as a critique of classical legal thought in the late nineteenth century and was developed 
by German and French jurists. These scholars challenged nineteenth-century classical 
legal liberalism’s individualistic assumptions, critiqued its abuse of logical deduction and 
condemned its social and economic consequences.3   
Social law jurists argued that individualistic classical liberal law was inadequate to 
deal with new, interdependent relations brought about by industrialization, urbanization, 
economic globalization and deep social changes of the late nineteenth-century.4 These 
scholars laid the foundations for and helped develop a new legal sphere called social law, 
doctrinally situated between traditional private law and public law, in which the State was 
an active participant. This new sphere introduced legal regimes we now associate with 
the regulatory state, such as labour legislation, social security, housing law, sanitary law 
and financial regulation.5 After World War I, there was also the rise of a new 
international law regime to deal with war that created new institutions based on the idea 
of interdependence.6 
                                                
3 See Kennedy, Duncan, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in Trubek, David & 
Santos, Alvaro, eds, The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge 
University Press 2006) 37-40; Gurvitch, Georges, Le Temps Présent et L'idée du Droit Social (Paris, J. 
Vrin 1932); Reimann, Mathias “Continental Imports - The Influence of European Law and Jurisprudence in 
the United States,” (1996) 64 Tijdschrift Voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 391, 398-99. 
4 Kennedy, Three Globalizations 38. 
5 Kennedy, Three Globalizations 38-39. 
6 The International Labour Organization (ILO) was founded by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to deal with 
the “labour question,” which was of increasing concern among Western powers and a potential source of 
international conflict. Constitution of the ILO, pmbl, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 2713–14, 225 Consol. 
T.S. 373 (“[C]onditions of labour exist involving such injustice hardship and privation to large numbers of 
people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled.”). The legal 
regime of labour law, which supersedes classical conceptions of property and contract, has conceptual 
parallels with a new international law regime that supersedes classical concepts of sovereignty. Both fields 
were influenced by social law ideas. This parallel is exemplified by the work of George Scelle, a French 
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Social law is paradoxical. Although it spread globally from Germany and France to 
become a truly international phenomenon, it was understood as having a unique relation 
to the particular society of each country where it took hold. Social law was often 
considered grounded on some primordial, traditional or religious character of each 
society that claimed it.7  
Mexico provides a useful case study of the use of nationalism by social law 
advocates. Mexico prides itself on its social legal system, which emerged out of the 1910 
revolution, was enshrined in the 1917 Constitution and has a self-image of being very 
progressive. The national identity justification of social law is not limited to labour 
regulation but, indeed, exists in other domains. Establishing a communal form of land 
ownership, in the form of “ejido,” was justified as an explicit opposition to the liberal and 
individualistic property rights system and a return to pre-liberal and colonial forms of 
land-tenure.8 The defence of the legal regime of natural resources, such as oil and water, 
is also often justified on national identity terms.   
When it comes to labour regulation, two main claims permeate the traditional narrative 
of Mexican labour law textbooks: first, that labour law is of Mexican origin and, second, 
that labour regulation is inherently progressive and helps all workers. Mexican labour law 
scholarship has helped shape and sustain the idea that social law stemmed from a unique 
Mexican reality – triggering the 1910 Mexican revolution – and that workers’ rights were 
inserted in the 1917 Constitution thanks to the genius of Mexicans intellectuals, scholars 
and politicians.9 The fact that the 1917 Mexican Constitution was the first in the world to 
enshrine workers’ rights has lent credibility to these claims. Mexican jurists argue that, 
just as France gave the world the first Declaration of the Rights of Men, Mexico gave the 
world the first Declaration of Social Rights. The inauguration of this social legal system 
within the 1917 Constitution has been closely associated with a progressive Mexican 
state. The native and progressive characteristics of the social state are so central to the 
state’s identity that to challenge them is to question its foundational justifications. It 
amounts to unveiling the state’s main foundational fictions.10  
                                                                                                                                            
jurist who began as a labour scholar and later became a renowned international law scholar. See eg Scelle, 
Georges Le Droit Ouvrier: Tableau de la Législation Française Actuelle (Paris, Armand Colin 1932); 
Scelle, Georges, Manuel Élémentaire de Droit International Public (Paris, Domat-Montchrestien 1943).  
7 Kennedy, Three Globalizations at 46-50; see eg, Shalakany, Amr Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of 
Comparative Law in the Arab World, in Riles, Annelise, ed, Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law 
152 (Portland, Hart Publishing 2001) (justifying the civil code socialisation by Sanhouri in Egypt as 
grounded on Islamic tradition); Kan’gara, Sylvia, “Analytical, Prescriptive and Resistant Characterizations 
of ‘African’ Conceptions of Property: A Critique of Mainstream Assumptions about African-Western 
Incompatibility” (SJD Dissertation, Harvard Law School 2003) (how the social function of property in 
Africa was justified using indigenous notions). 
8 See Nuñez Luna, Alejandra, “Water Law and the Making of the Mexican State, 1875-1917” (SJD 
Dissertation, Harvard Law School 2011); Simpson, Eyler N., The Ejido? Mexico’s Way Out (Chapel Hill, 
UNC Press 1937). 
9 See eg Noriega Cantú, Alfonso, Los Derechos Sociales, Creación de la Revolución de 1910 y de la 
Constitución de 1917 (Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 1988). 
10 I borrow the term “foundational fictions” from Doris Sommer, who argued that the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century novels in Latin America intended to foster a “passionate patriotism” in the new 
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One way to think about the traditional labour law narrative is that Mexico has an 
originalist constitutional tradition that is progressive and associated with the left. Think 
of the work of Frank Michelman and William Forbath, depicting a social tradition in the 
US, wherein welfare rights (work, housing, health) can be based on the constitution.11 
Now imagine this stance represents the mainstream position. 
This section analyzes the mainstream labour law scholarship in Mexico. I focus 
particularly on the work of Mario de la Cueva, the foremost labour law scholar and one 
of the main architects in constructing the legal foundation for the social state. He 
imagined, argued and worked for the reconstruction of the Mexican legal system around 
social law.12 I suggest that De la Cueva is to the Mexican twentieth century legal system 
what Diego Rivera is to Mexican art – not because of equal fame or notoriety, but 
because they shared a passion and a vision about the new social order, and created an 
aesthetic and legal narrative to support it. Rivera heralds the post-Revolution Mexican 
state as the modern response to colonialism and economic exploitation. Rivera’s murals 
are an elegy to the new man, the worker, emancipated from his past chains. De la Cueva 
paints the legal regime that would ensure workers’ liberation.  
 
Rivera depicts the country in a path of industrialization, where nineteenth century 
bourgeois capitalism, the old economic regime against which the revolution rebelled, is 
superseded by a socialist state. The character of that social state is still not fully defined, 
but it becomes clear early on that it is not a communist state. De la Cueva’s murals are 
his major Mexican Labour Law textbooks, which create, document and justify this story 
in legal theory and doctrine. Describing the creation of Mexican labour law, De la Cueva 
tells us: 
 
Mexican labour law is a statute imposed by life, a cry by men that only 
knew of exploitation and ignored the meaning of the term: my rights as a 
human being. It was born in the first social revolution of the 20th century 
and found its most beautiful historic crystallization in the 1917 
Constitution. Before those years there were efforts in defence of men, 
actions were undertaken and ideas presented, but a regime that gave back 
to work its liberty and dignity had not been achieved; they were lost in the 
centuries of slavery, of servitude and of the bourgeoisie’s private law. The 
idea that has now reached a universal character had not been declared: 
                                                                                                                                            
nations. See Sommer, Doris, Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America (University 
of California Press 1991). 
11 See eg Michelman, Frank, “The Supreme Court, 1968 Term — Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
through the Fourteenth Amendment” (1969) 83 Harvard L. Rev. 7 (arguing equality of opportunity is 
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution); Michelman, Frank, “In 
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice” (1973) 121 U. PA. L. 
Rev. 962 (discussing John Rawls’ theory of inherent welfare rights based on the tradition of “western 
individualistic democratic liberalism”); Forbath, William, “The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ 
Rights” (2011) 72 Ohio State Law Journal 1115 (depicting the history and significance of labour and 
workers rights as fundamental rights).    
12 De la Cueva, Mario, El Nuevo Derecho del Trabajo, 13th edn (Mexico, Editorial Porrúa 1993). 
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labour law constitutes the new rights of the human person, the base 
without which the old rights of men are not possible.13 
 
This section problematizes this traditional narrative, most articulately formulated by 
De la Cueva. I argue first that the critique to nineteenth century private law and the 
proposal for social law as a way to overcome the doctrinal limitations and undesirable 
economic consequences of legal liberalism was not purely Mexican in origin. Second, I 
claim that the nature of the political compromise that enabled the constitutionalisation of 
labour rights and the creation of new social law institutions was less radical at its 
inception, and less progressive as applied, than is commonly portrayed.  
 
Before subjecting the traditional narrative to scrutiny, however, I will describe its 
relevance in the current labour reform debates. Political parties, activists and scholars 
refer to the achievements of the Constitution and the historically progressive character of 
labour legislation to buttress their positions. Exploring the grip this narrative has on the 
way actors think and talk about labour regulation clarifies the relevance of its critique and 
the possibilities that may open if we go beyond it.  
 
A. The Debate about Labour Law Reform In Mexico  
Labour law reform has been the subject of political debate for the last 22 years, since 
liberalization reforms were introduced in the country by the Salinas administration 
between 1988-1994. In this protracted debate, the achievements of the Revolution and the 
historical legacy of the Mexican constitution play an important, if not always explicit, 
role. The nationalist discourse that emerged after the Mexican revolution, created and 
consolidated during seven decades of a one-state-party system in which the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) ruled, praised constitutionally protected workers’ rights and 
labour legislation as a historical achievement. This legislation was considered a key pillar 
of the country’s modern social, economic and political life. Today, more than two 
decades after the introduction of economic liberalization policies, labour law reform is 
considered a “pending” structural reform and is once again at the centre of political 
debate. Since 1990, multiple proposals have been introduced, including bills by the three 
main political parties: the centre-right National Action Party (PAN), which has ruled the 
country since 2000, the leftist Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) and, in 2011, the PRI. 
After the 2012 presidential elections and with a newly-elected congress, outgoing-
President Calderón introduced a labour bill that this time congress will be required to 
vote on.14  
The Constitution and federal labour law grant substantial protections to workers. 
They took employment relations out of the civil law domain and created the country’s 
social security system. In 1917, Article 123 enshrined workers rights in the Mexican 
                                                
13 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho, vol 1, 38 (emphasis in original). 
14 Proyecto Decreto que Reforma, Adiciona y Deroga Diversas Disposiciones de la Ley Federal del 
Trabajo, LXII Legislature (1 September 2012) 
www.stps.gob.mx/bp/secciones/sala_prensa/Ini_Ref_Laboral_2012.pdf. 
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Constitution and granted workers considerable protections.15 Based on these 
constitutional rights, the federal labour law regulates the labour market in great detail, 
dealing with both individual and collective employment relations. Article 123 seeks to 
establish an equilibrium between workers and employers, and to advance social justice.16 
It stipulates that labour is not an article of commerce; it should safeguard workers’ 
freedom and dignity and guarantee a decent standard of living.17 Importantly, federal 
labour law’s procedural section is guided by a default rule that stipulates that whenever 
there is doubt in the interpretation of the law, the Conciliation and Arbitral Board will 
choose the one that favours workers.18 The Board is also required to supplement workers’ 
briefs when failing to request benefits they are entitled to.19  
 
Despite these generous protections, Mexico’s labour market is in dire straits. The 
working population totals approximately 50 million people.20 Every year, one million 
youths become economically active and ready to enter the labour market; the country’s 
economy has been able to create only half of those jobs.21 People migrate to the US to 
find jobs, but many enter the informal economy by working on petty street commerce or 
enter the ranks of drug cartels or other criminal organizations.22 Unemployment is 
approximately 5.4 per cent, but this number does not capture a significant number of 
workers: the approximately 8.3 per cent who are underemployed.23 Of the employed, a 
great number have very precarious jobs, with meagre wages and no benefits. In fact, real 
                                                
15 Article 123 includes the following requirements and provisions: eight-hour maximum workday; 
minimum one day off per week; double payment for over-time work; prohibition on child labour; paid 
maternity leave; right to equal pay for equal work regardless of gender; establishment of a minimum, living 
wage; wage protection against discounts or reductions for debt obligations; establishment of employers’ 
liability for workplace accidents and illnesses; establishment of workers’ right to a share in the firm’s 
profits; employers must comply with health and safety regulations; housing requirements for certain 
sectors; recognized the right to unionize and the right to strike; employers cannot dismiss workers without 
cause; and establishing of a tri-partite arbitral and conciliation boards to solve disputes between capital and 
labour, staffed by government representatives, employers and workers. Political Constitution of the United 
Mexican States (hereinafter “Mexican Constitution”), Art. 123 (1917). 
16 Federal Labour Law of Mexico (Ley Federal de Trabajo) Art. 2. 
17 Idem 3. 
18 Idem 18. 
19 Idem 685.  
20 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), Indicadores Oportunos de Ocupación Y Empleo 
[“Job Indicators”] (2012) www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/contenidos/espanol/prensa/comunicados/ocupbol.pdf. 
21 Zepeda, Eduardo; Wise, Timothy, and Gallagher, Kevin, Rethinking Trade Policy for Development: 
Lessons From Mexico Under NAFTA (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, D.C., 
Carnegie Endowment 2009); Kurtzman, Joel, “Mexico's Job-Creation Problem,” WSJ, 3 August 2007,  
online.wsj.com/article/SB118610985048187068.html. 
22 From 1990 to 2010, approximately 8.9 million Mexicans migrated to the United States. A recent report, 
however, found that migration declined significantly in the last five years. Pew Hispanic Center, "The 
Mexican-American Boom: Births Overtake Immigration" at 3 (2011) 
www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/144.pdf. Possible explanations include increased unemployment and 
greater deportations in the US and a spike of violence in the border area, decreasing birth rates and broader 
economic opportunities in Mexico. Pew Hispanic Center, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—and 
Perhaps Less” (2012) www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/Mexican-migrants-report_final.pdf  
23 INEGI, Job Indicators 2011, 
www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/contenidos/espanol/prensa/comunicados/ocupbol.asp. 
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minimum wages have declined dramatically in the last four decades.24 This suggests that 
even in the formal economy there is a wide de facto flexibility in the labour market due to 
low wages, informal or illegal part-time contracting by employers, outsourcing and the 
non-provision of legally-mandated benefits. This further suggests that a considerable part 
of the productivity gains in recent years have relied on decreased labour costs. 
Consequently, the share of productivity gains to labour in general terms has decreased.25  
Now consider the reform proposals advanced by the main political parties. Over the 
past twelve years, each of the two government administrations headed by the PAN has 
introduced a labour law bill. These bills proposed making labour market regulation more 
flexible by creating new part-time, trial and training employment contracts. They also 
proposed changes to collective bargaining rules that would make it harder for workers to 
strike, prohibit closed-shop agreements and stop automatic withholding of union fees by 
the employer. The PAN also proposes to introduce transparency and union democracy by 
requiring free and secret elections (for strikes, control over collective agreements and 
union leadership), imposing the obligation for unions to publish their balance sheets and 
make them available to members, and requiring the publication of unions’ registration, 
collective agreements and firms’ internal workplace regulations.  
Opposition to the PAN bills has come from different sectors. These include the leftist 
PRD, unions, activists, NGOs and labour law scholars. Many have emphasized the bill’s 
violation of fundamental workers’ rights recognized not only in the Mexican constitution 
but also in international conventions. In their view, the PAN bill sought to introduce the 
neoliberal flexibility agenda, which jeopardized fundamental workers’ rights and 
threatened to impoverish workers and weaken unions. Activists referred to the conquests 
of the Mexican Revolution and the achievements of the Constitution as a way to resist the 
neoliberal program, often portrayed as an import of an economic agenda designed abroad 
and supported by employers, foreign economic interests and international financial 
institutions. In addition, a number of independent unions and NGOs brought a complaint 
before the NAFTA’s National Administrative Office, claiming the bill violated NAFTA’s 
labour side agreement.26 Faced with the PAN’s bills, many groups on the left have 
preferred the status quo.  
                                                
24 “The real minimum wages in 2000 represented only a third of those of 1980; national wages in 2000 
were equivalent to 50 per cent of those of 1980. By 2000, wages and salaries in large manufacturing plants 
had dropped to less than 40 per cent of their level in 1990.” Salas, Carlos and Zepeda, Eduardo, Empleo y 
Salarios en el Mexico Contemporáneo, in La Situacion del Trabajo en Mexico 37, 55 (México, Instituto de 
Estudios del Trabajo 2003); Fairris, David, Popli, Gurleen and Zepeda, Eduardo, “Minimum Wages and the 
Wage Structure in Mexico” (University of California Riverside, July 2005), 
http://economics.ucr.edu/papers/papers05/05-09.pdf, 4, 23, 28; Zepeda, Rethinking Trade Policy 13-14. 
25 Enrique Hernández Laos, La productividad en Mexico: Origen y Distribución 1960–2002, in Salas, 
Carlos, ed, La Nueva, Situación del Trabajo en Mexico 2000-2003 (Mexico City, Instituto de Estudio del 
Trabajo, 2006) 161, 168-69 (although productivity has remained low in Mexico from 1988–2002, workers 
transferred much of their productivity gains to employers); see also Polanski, Sandra Mexican Employment, 
Productivity, and Income a Decade After NAFTA, 
www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/canadasenatebrief.pdf (Carnegie Endowment 2004). 
26 See U.S. NAO Public Submission US2005-01 from the Washington Office on Latin America, to U.S. 
Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs (Feb. 17, 2005) 
www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/submissions/Sub2005-01.htm (requesting that the U.S. National 
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On the left, the PRD and the Workers’ National Union (UNT), an association of 
independent unions, have proposed a bill that seeks to ensure stable and decent jobs in a 
manner that could be consistent with productivity gains, to dismantle corporatist 
institutions that benefit official unions and stifle union democracy, and to reform the 
dispute settlement system.27 The PRD-UNT bill accepts some degree of flexibility 
introducing, for instance, a limited version of the trial employment contract, but rejects 
other flexibility modalities, including the formalization of outsourcing, proposed by the 
PAN and PRI. The bill emphasizes that decisions on how to deploy labour to ensure 
productivity, including training and promotion, must be taken bilaterally.28 It also 
proposes to index wages to inflation to avoid further decline in real wages.29 On 
collective bargaining institutions, the PRD-UNT bill proposes the creation of an 
autonomous Public Registry, in charge of registering new unions and ownership over 
collective bargaining agreements, taking that role away from the Ministry of Labour. It 
keeps current rules that seek to resolve collective action problems. For instance, it 
partially keeps the closed shop agreement, requiring workers to become union members 
when they are hired – if the union and the employer have so agreed– but eliminates the 
closed shop by exclusion, enabling workers to exit the union without being fired. It also 
keeps rules that require employers to retain union fees. Finally, on administration of 
justice, the bill would eliminate the long-standing tripartite Conciliation and Arbitration 
Boards and replace them with labour courts, staffed by independent judges under the 
jurisdiction of the judiciary.30 
The PRI, which had opposed the labour law reform proposals made by this and the 
previous PAN administrations and the PRD, introduced its own bill in 2011.31 The PRI’s 
bill introduces significant forms of flexibility, leaves collective bargaining institutions 
largely untouched, and preserves the current dispute settlement system. First, it proposes 
a series of changes to the standard employment contract by introducing flexibility in 
hiring and firing.32 It also seeks to formalize and regulate outsourcing, an extended 
                                                                                                                                            
Administrative Office work with the Mexican government to eliminate alleged NAALC violations in the 
labor law reform proposal). 
27 Gaceta Parlamentaria, Cámara de Diputados, número 2989-IV (15 April 2010) 
www.derechoasaber.org/data/arch_segui/_i200410-4.doc. 
28 The bill requires firms to regularly send financial status reports to its workers. Art 116. It also introduces 
some flexibility while also preventing the precarisation of jobs via low wages, unstable jobs and scarce 
benefits. Pmbl. The bill recognizes the importance of performance-based promotion rather than seniority, 
as well as the importance to train workers for multiple tasks. See eg Art 353-Z 19. It proposes that these 
decisions are taken bilaterally and based on productivity benchmarks. See Art 84. To ensure that goal, it 
proposes the creation of a firm-level Commission for Wages, Training and Productivity. Ch 2.  
29 It proposes eliminating the current Minimum Wage Commission, a tripartite organization composed by 
representatives of government, employers and official unions. Instead, the bill creates the National 
Commission for Wages, Training and Productivity, dependent on Congress and not on the Executive. Ch 2. 
30 PRD proposes to eliminate the distinction between Section A and Section B of Article 123, regulating 
private and public sector employment in the same way. Pmbl. This would grant public sector workers 
collective bargaining rights that they currently lack, primarily the right to strike. 
31 Propuesta que reforma, adiciona y deroga diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal del Trabajo (“PRI 
bill”), Gaceta Parlamentaria Número 3218-II (2011). 
32 The bill introduces hourly wages and multiple forms of new contract terms that would enable widespread 
use of part-time, fixed-term, and trial employment. PRI bill 32; 40. 
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employer practice that is currently illegal.33 The government would remain in control of 
union registration and certification of elections and ownership of collective agreements.34  
It consolidates the conciliation and arbitration boards but leaves them as tripartite bodies 
largely dependent on the executive power. Thus, it seems that the PRI bill seeks to 
compromise between two of its traditional constituencies: On the one hand, the bill seeks 
to satisfy employers who demand greater forms of flexibility in hiring and firing, limits to 
back wages payments for unfair dismissal and greater control over the allocation of 
labour to multiple tasks and over promotion. On the other hand, the bill seeks to 
guarantee that traditional corporatist unions will continue to enjoy a great degree of 
control over collective bargaining institutions, keeping independent unions at bay. The 
government would continue to have considerable say in the unions’ governance system, 
keeping decisions of registration, confirmation of leadership and collective agreement 
control in the Ministry of Labour.  
After twelve years as the opposition, the PRI won the 2012 presidential election and 
will soon be back in power. As the party that controlled the presidency and pretty much 
all branches of government for more than seven decades – and as the creator of the 
national revolutionary discourse – the PRI’s bill is indicative of the debate to come and 
the upcoming government’s agenda. In its preamble, the PRI bill makes several 
references to the historical achievement of the 1917 Constitution in enshrining workers’ 
rights: 
The 1917 Constitution created Article 123, which for the first time in 
history elevated labour law to the highest normative level. This was a 
fundamental decision, bedrock of the modern State that has received 
utmost recognition in the world.35  
At every point, the bill declares that the proposed changes are necessary to improve 
the country’s economic condition but are consistent with the historical achievements of 
the Constitution and respect workers’ fundamental rights: 
It is necessary to generate confidence in a private and international 
investment that creates jobs in the formal economy while observing the 
basic values of Article 123 and the basic rights of workers … These rights 
must be well protected, as they have been since our first federal labour 
legislation from 1931, and as they should be, being an example for all 
social legislations in the world.36  
The PRI revives the national revolutionary discourse to reach a compromise between 
supportive capital and official labour. It is not surprising that the bill preserves the 
privileges of the big labour unions traditionally affiliated to the PRI. However, the 
malleability of the social law discourse is significant: the PRI resorts to social law 
discourse to introduce a labour flexibility agenda, dear to business actors, that is 
anathema to many of the labour protections associated with the social position. It does so 
                                                
33 PRI bill 24.  
34 Ibid 23. 
35 Ibid at 20.  
36 Ibid 21. 
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by appealing to national pride and vowing continuity with the very constitutional 
principles that the bill purports to modify.37  
The stakes of labour reform are high. At bottom lie different visions of how to best 
increase firm productivity, the relationship between labour and capital, the state’s 
involvement in unions’ governance system, collective bargaining and dispute settlement. 
These different visions have diametrically different implications for the distribution of 
power and resources between capital and labour, and for democracy in the workplace. 
Beyond the particular rules supported by the political parties, I am interested in a 
common theme in these bills that evokes the historical achievement of the Mexican 
Constitution. This trope is used both by those who want to oppose the neoliberal 
flexibility program and those who want to preserve the corporativist regime currently in 
place.  
It is hard not to wonder why social law rhetoric, particularly concerning the 
constitutionalisation of social rights, is so powerful in Mexico. Why does this alleged 
historical achievement remain so appealing in contemporary debates? It would be useful 
to investigate why it exerts so much influence: How it is that it still strikes a cord that 
seems to go to the very sense of selfhood of the nation? Or, conversely, if nobody 
believes in it any longer, if the once-faithful citizens have lost their faith, why do the 
dogmas of such national faith need to be invoked de rigueur in the debate? Is this just a 
simulation, a currency political actors have to use in the public space, a faith they 
disbelieve in private but nonetheless profess in public? Whether this professed faith is the 
expression of an honest belief or a cynical position, it seems worth examining what lies 
behind this historical assumption. Subjecting this claim to critical scrutiny can shed light 
on what is at stake in the “practice” of subscribing to it and reinforcing its validity.  
In the following section, I will examine Mexico’s traditional labour law narrative, 
outlining its main claims and probing why it has such as grip on the way people think 
about Mexico’s history and its future. As I will show, legal scholars played a very 
important role in weaving a discourse about “social law” that would become closely 
associated to the nation’s character. Legal scholars’ reconstruction of the legal system 
around the idea of social law, crystallized in the 1917 Constitution, would also be the 
reconstruction of the nation’s self for much part of the twentieth century.  
                                                
37 As soon as Congress began its session in September 2012, outgoing president Calderón proposed a new 
labour bill that, under a recently adopted legislative rule, requires Congress to vote the bill up or down 
within sixty days. This bill is very similar to previous PAN bills and is an attempt by the government to 
leave office with a badge of passing a much-touted “structural” reform. The bill was met with resistance by 
the left and provoked massive street demonstrations. The PRI, which now controls the House of 
Representatives, approved flexibility reforms to the employment contract but eliminated all proposals to 
democratize the union governance system. Thus, the PRI has achieved the same compromise between 
flexibility and corporatism it was seeking in its own bill. The PAN seemed willing to forego its union 
democracy proposals to achieve a labour reform and joined forces with PRI. After a heated debate and a 
few amendments the bill was finally passed. Senate of Mexico, LXII Legislature, BOLETÍN-0481 “Avala 
Senado Reforma Laboral y Envía al Ejecutivo los Artículos Aprobados Por Ambas Cámaras.” 13 
November 2012. 
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B. Workers’ Rights: A National Invention? 
Mexican legal scholars emphasize the national invention of social and workers’ rights, 
and consider Mexico’s 1917 Constitution to be a significant contribution to the world’s 
jurisprudential history as the first “Declaration of Social Rights.” I have identified three 
main claims: (1) social and workers’ rights are the result of the 1910 Mexican revolution 
and, thus, a response to Mexican socioeconomic reality; (2) workers’ rights are the 
invention of Mexican actors, be they intellectuals, revolutionary leaders, legal scholars, 
or politicians; and (3) workers’ rights are the product of the 1917 Constitution and 
resulted from that historical constitutional debate.  
 
These claims are prevalent in the traditional narrative of Mexican labour law 
scholarship. Affirmed by the canonical texts in the field and passed on to every 
generation of law students, there seems to be a strong interest in reinforcing the Mexican 
contribution to the origin of workers’ rights and, more broadly, social rights. In this 
section, I explore these claims and, given the difficulty in sustaining this assumption, I 
begin to explore what may be the reasons for maintaining a nationalistic narrative.  
i. Workers’ Rights as the Result of the 1910 Mexican Revolution 
Traditional labour law scholarship considers the creation of workers’ rights and of social 
rights in general to be an achievement of the 1910 revolution.38 According to this view, 
the revolution was a response to the oppressive social and economic conditions under 
which workers and peasants lived during the long dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. This 
socioeconomic reality inspired the development of workers’ rights and labour law. 
According to De la Cueva, the 1917 Mexican Constitution is itself the first Declaration of 
Social Rights.39 De la Cueva asserts that this Declaration “stemmed from the tragedy and 
suffering of the people, and it was a natural, genuine, and authentic creation of the 
Mexican people, of the men who offered their life in the war of the revolution.”40  
 
The connection between the 1910 Mexican Revolution and the enactment of workers’ 
rights is not as straightforward as the traditional narrative assumes. “Social” legislation 
existed before the armed movement. De la Cueva himself references labour legislation in 
Mexico preceding the revolution. For instance, in the last decade of the dictatorial regime 
of Porfirio Diaz from 1900 to 1910, two Mexican states enacted pro-worker statutes: In 
1904, the State of Mexico enacted a workers’ compensation law for injuries caused by 
workplace accidents, making employers liable for health care costs and full salary for up 
                                                
38 The Mexican revolution started in 1910 and lasted for a decade. For a comprehensive treatment of the 
Mexican Revolution see Knight, Alan, The Mexican Revolution, Vol 1: Porfirians, Liberals, and Peasants 
(University of Nebraska Press 1990) and Knight, Alan, The Mexican Revolution, Volume 2: Counter-
revolution and Reconstruction (University of Nebraska Press 1990). See also Womack, John Zapata and 
the Mexican Revolution (Vintage 1970).  
39 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 44.  
40 Ibid. 
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to three months.41 In 1906, the state of Nuevo León also enacted a law for workplace 
accidents.42 
 
Furthermore, according to De la Cueva, during the interventionist government of 
Maximiliano of Habsburg -an Austrian prince imposed by the French government at the 
behest and with the collaboration of conservative groups in Mexico- Maximiliano 
enacted Mexico’s first labour law, the “Labour Law of the Empire” (1865).43 As De la 
Cueva points out, this law contained some of the workers’ benefits later enshrined in the 
1917 Constitution.44 It is telling that so many years before the Mexican revolution, 
Maximiliano, a European prince arguably detached from the Mexican reality, had 
implemented pro-worker legislation.45 However, De la Cueva does not seem to give 
much importance to these historical precedents. 
 
Examples in De la Cueva’s books suggest that labour laws were enacted before the 
1910 Revolution in at least two states. In fact, a foreign ruler had introduced pro-worker 
legislation as early as the mid-nineteenth century. This evidence weakens the assumption 
that only the revolution’s unique context had influenced the content of the 1917 
Constitution. In fact, existing legal doctrines and ideas about social law originating in 
Europe and circulating worldwide also seem to have provided ammunition in the passing 
of this legislation. As I will discuss below, the revolution may have accelerated the 
enactment of labour laws by different states throughout the country, and it may have 
given a justification to the members of the Constitutional Assembly to enshrine workers’ 
rights in the Constitution, but the revolution cannot be considered the sole determinant.  
ii. Workers’ Rights as the Invention of Mexican Intellectuals and 
Legal Scholars  
Another important argument in labour law scholarship posits that the intellectual origin of 
workers’ rights in the country is entirely Mexican. Additionally, scholars argue that the 
various labour laws enacted in the country after the Revolution were entirely a domestic 
development and were not influenced by foreign laws. However, at the time, important 
ideas promoting the need to establish workers’ rights were fermenting in the public 
debate transnationally. As I will show, some of the main intellectuals and legislators 
promoting the recognition of workers’ rights were participants in a transnational 
movement for labour rights and were influenced by social law discussions going on in 
other countries. 
                                                
41 Ibid 43. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid 41.  
44 Ibid. 
45 This may be viewed as an early attempt to import into Mexico some of the legal doctrinal developments 
and legislation in Europe at the time. 
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a. Influence of Foreign Ideas 
In his book, Social Rights, A Creation of the 1910 Revolution and of the 1917 
Constitution,46 Alfonso Noriega Cantú, an influential Mexican legal scholar, attributed 
the origin of social rights to the Mexican Revolution and the Mexican Constitution. He 
explicitly addressed the question of whether the 1910 Mexican Revolution was inspired 
or influenced by Marx’s ideas and those of other critics of the capitalist system.47 Noriega 
contended that foreign theories had “no influence whatsoever” on the actors of the 
Revolution or those who wrote the Constitution and concluded that the 1910 Revolution 
“formed its ideological content inspired in the Mexican historical reality.”48  
 
In the course of arguing about the indigeneity of the 1910 revolution, Noriega 
identifies several Mexican intellectuals who promoted the creation of social rights in the 
period before the Revolution.49 These were the great critics of Porfirio Diaz’s dictatorship 
whose critiques were expressed in the Program of the Liberal Party of 1906 and Flores 
Magón’s newspaper Regeneración, among other sources.50 These ideas were articulated 
in the two most influential Manifestos of the Revolution, the Plan de San Luis and Plan 
de Ayala, issued by revolutionary leaders Ignacio I. Madero and Emiliano Zapata, 
respectively.51 Unfortunately, Noriega neglected to investigate the intellectual 
background of the Mexican critics he refers to, especially of the most central among 
them, Ricardo Flores Magón. 
 
Consider Ricardo Flores Magón, who Noriega and most labour law scholars recognize 
as an intellectual influence of the Revolution52 and of labour law legislation.53 Noriega 
failed to inquire into Flores Magón’s background and did not notice that he was a 
participant in a transnational intellectual and political movement critiquing economic 
liberalism and promoting “social law” ideas. Flores Magón’s publications, along with a 
variety of biographies, highlight the influence of European and US thinkers on his liberal 
and anarchist political theories.54 That Flores Magón was influenced by and was himself 
in conversation with foreign ideas and intellectuals does not diminish his intellectual 
                                                
46 Noriega Cantú, Derechos sociales 83. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Noriega Cantú, Derechos Sociales 83.  
50 Noriega Cantú, Derechos Sociales 83. 
51 Ibid. 
52 De la Cueva also maintains that the 1906 Manifesto of the Liberal Party, which Flores Magón presided, 
is “the most important pre-revolutionary document in favor of the creation of a labour law. De la Cueva 
Nuevo Derecho 42.  
53 Nestor De Buen – perhaps the most prominent labour law scholar in Mexico today – argues that Flores 
Magón’s influence over some leaders eventually translated into specific legislation as the leaders seized 
power in a variety of states. De Buen, Nestor, Derecho del Trabajo, 2nd edn vol 1 (Mexico, Editorial 
Porrúa 2010) 334. De Buen notes that for instance, General Manuel M. Dieguez, one of the leaders of the 
strike of Cananea (1906), in which Flores Magón was greatly involved, later enacted a labour law for the 
state of Jalisco (1914). Ibid 330. 
54 See Crockroft, James, Intellecutal Precurosors of the Mexican Revolution 1900-1913 (Austin, University 
of Texas Press 1968) 117-133; García Cantú, Gastón, El Socialismo en Mexico. Siglo XIX, 1st edn (Mexico, 
ERA 1969) 120-29. 
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stature or originality. It does, however, cast doubt on the assertion that social rights ideas, 
even those promoted by Flores Magón, were homegrown. 
  
The Catholic Social Doctrine was an additional intellectual source in the creation of 
social law. The influence of social Catholicism in Mexico can be traced to the second half 
of nineteenth century.55 Labour scholars have recognized the importance of this doctrine 
in labour law in general, and in the Mexican labour regime in particular.56 Notably, Pope 
Leon XIII’s Rerum Novarum advocated for the reconciliation of social classes, affirming 
that “without work there can be no capital, neither can be work without capital.”57 
Among its main postulates, the encyclical included respect for private property, 
conciliation of classes, mutual cooperation for capitalist production and workers’ welfare 
and unionization to assure decent living conditions.58 If these ideas had an impact in the 
creation of labour legislation, it would be evidence of yet additional influence of foreign 
ideas in the Mexican intellectual and political milieu that resulted in the protection of 
workers’ rights.  
b. Influence of Foreign Laws   
Just as there is a tendency to deny the influence of foreign ideas in the creation of 
workers’ rights in Mexico, there is also a tendency to deny the influence of foreign laws 
in the local labour legislations that followed the 1910 Revolution. De la Cueva, for 
instance, notes that the 1918 Labour Law of the State of Veracruz – the first State statute 
enacted after the promulgation of the Constitution – emphasized the statute’s national 
character in its preamble.59  
 
“[I]t was a permanent criterion to create a law, that was above anything else, Mexican 
… that was a product of our environment, a legitimate daughter of our Revolution and 
of our fundamental laws, that faithfully responded to our needs. …We did not want to 
fill the law with translations or copies of foreign laws, even if wise; we did not want to 
include any precept for the sake of an elegant or precise form which was formulated 
by legislators of other countries; we fundamentally wanted to guarantee the 
application of the law to our environment, to our social and political conditions, to our 
present situation.60 
 
For De la Cueva, this was consistent with Mexican labour law’s origin, which was “born 
in the fields and from revolutionary men, and which is not and has never been an extra 
logical imitation of other peoples’ norms.”61 According to De la Cueva, Veracruz’s 
statute would greatly influence the first federal labour law (1931). The assertion of 
                                                
55 García Cantú refers to the activism of Plotino C. Rhodakanaty and his association called “La Social.” 
See ibid 172-179. 
56 De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 191-93, Noriega Cantu, Derechos Sociales 7; Garcia Cantu, El 
Socialismo en Mexico 172-795. 
57 De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 192. 
58 De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 192-193. 
59 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid 51. 
 17 
national origin, however, is in tension with a previous acknowledgment. De la Cueva had 
already pointed out that the 1904 and 1906 state laws were greatly inspired by the French 
Law of 1898.62 In fact, by 1918 Congress considered it preferable to enact specific laws 
to address each of the various aspects of labour relations rather than a single code.63 
According to De la Cueva, this position explains the two draft laws for “workplace 
accidents,” “one of which … was preceded by an excellent exposition of the theory of 
professional risk.”64 The theory of professional risk, as De la Cueva noted, was a French 
legal development. The importation of this theory into this draft project, and finally to the 
1931 federal law, seems clear. 
iii. Workers’ Rights as a Creation of the 1917 Mexican Constitution 
There is no stronger claim about the Mexican provenance of workers’ rights than the 
proposition that Mexico’s 1917 Constitution was the first in the world to enshrine such 
rights. Labour law textbooks commonly cite Mexico as the “first country to enact social 
rights in a constitution.”65   
 
Based on this temporal advantage, Mexican scholars often argue that the Mexican 
Constitution created the concept of social rights, and that such rights were Mexicans’ 
direct response to their country’s reality.66 My interest in this section is not to debate the 
temporal priority of the Mexican Constitution in the inclusion of these rights, which 
seems clear, but to inquire about the origin of these ideas and how workers’ rights made 
it into the constitutional text.  
 
Mexico’s legislative activity after the Revolution shows that the inclusion of worker’s 
rights in the 1917 Constitution did not happen in a vacuum. Rather, it had an immediate 
precedent in the legislative work of states during the years of the revolution. Between 
1914 and 1917 – from the overthrowing of General Victoriano Huerta to the victory of 
Carranza over the other revolutionary factions – a number of Mexican states enacted 
labour legislation recognizing a series of workers’ rights.67 Some of these laws paid 
explicit attention to labour laws in other countries.68 
 
The existence of foreign influence in the Constitution is evident from the comments in 
the Constitutional Assembly. In a revealing moment, Alfonso Cravioto made a now 
widely-cited pronouncement that compared the Mexican Revolution and its Constitution 
                                                
62 Ibid 43. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid 52. 
65 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 52. Nestor de Buen concludes a chapter about the history of social rights 
stating: “thus was born the first precept that granted rights to workers at a constitutional level. Mexico 
entered history as the first country that incorporated social guarantees in a Constitution.” De Buen, Derecho 
del Trabajo 343; see also Diario de los Debates del Congreso Constituyente, 1916-1917, Mexico 1960. 
66 Trueba-Urbina, Alberto, La Primera Constitución Político-Social del Mundo (Mexico, Editorial 
Porrúa,1971). 
67 De Buen Lozano, Derecho del Trabajo 329-334; De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 98-100. 
68 De Buen notes that these state laws that preceded the Constitution ranged from very simple to 
sophisticated legislations and that some included comparative law references. De Buen, Derecho del 
Trabajo 333. 
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to the French revolution and its subsequent Declaration of the Rights of Man.69 Yet, in 
this same speech, Cravioto made an additional important revelation: he rose to defend 
Carranza and José Natividad Macías, who, in the heated debates, had been branded 
“conservatives” by the radicals. He praised Carranza’s interest in labour, noting that 
“Carranza had commissioned Macías to go to the United States and study there, 
profusely, the future Mexican labour laws.”70 
 
Similarly, labour scholar Alberto Trueba-Urbina, a staunch supporter of the originality 
of the Mexican Constitution, discusses the 1916-17 Constitutional Congress and the 
process of creation of Article 123.71 Among the many documents he refers to, however, 
one can find the very same project of the Commission for Article 123, headed by 
Natividad Macías, establishing the basis for labour legislation. In the Preamble, the 
influence of foreign ideas is evident: 
 
[T]he useful lessons that foreign countries have given us, concerning the 
favourable conditions in which their economic prosperity takes place, due 
to the social reforms implemented … suffice to justify this initiative, so 
that it can take effect this time and fill the existing gap of our codes, to 
maintain the desired equilibrium in the relationships between workers and 
employers, subordinated to the moral interests of humanity in general, and 
of our nationality in particular.72 
 
It is clear that Mexican Congressmen were very aware of labour legislation in other 
parts of the world. There is an important difference between enshrining workers rights in 
the Mexican Constitution and claiming that workers’ rights, or more broadly social rights, 
are the creation of the Mexican Constitution. There is no doubt that those participating in 
the Assembly deemed these rights necessary for the Mexican socio-economic conditions. 
But the legal, doctrinal, philosophical developments that led to the creation of those 
rights did not stem organically from the socio-economic conditions that the new 
constitution sought to remedy.  
 
Some of Article 123’s key provisions, including the eight-hour work day, the 
prohibition of child labour and the employer responsibility for workplace accidents, were 
the topics of Mexican and other countries’ legislation before the Revolution. Consider the 
French doctrine imposing liability on employers for workplace accidents, moving away 
from fault or negligence liability and towards strict liability.73 The legal theory that the 
State could regulate relations between employers and workers directly by requiring a 
minima of conditions, rather than leaving those to the parties’ free will; the moral idea 
                                                
69 Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen (France), 26 August 1789, 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b52410.html. 
70 Rouaix, Pastor, Genesis de los Articulos 27 y 123 de la Constitución Política de 1917 (Colegio de la 
Frontera 1959) 89 (emphasis added). 
71 Trueba-Urbina, Derecho social 152. 
72 Ibid 153 (emphasis added). 
73 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 19 (the workers’ compensation law – promoted by Minister Waldeck-
Rouseeau and other members of the socialist party – was among the first French labour laws adopted after 
the War of 1870).   
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that the state had an obligation to stop exploitation and improve the conditions under 
which workers laboured and lived; and the economic idea that this regulation was 
beneficial to society all existed before the debates in the Constitutional Assembly.  
 
It is possible to believe that the inclusion of worker’s rights in the Mexican 
constitution corresponded to a political opportunity that was seized by Mexicans 
influenced by these ideas at the end of the revolution. In this sense, the struggle for 
workers’ rights and the idea of social law were connected to a truly international 
phenomenon. But to conclude that social rights – and more specifically workers’ rights – 
were the creation of the Revolution, the original creation of Mexican intellectuals and 
legal scholars or the product of the 1917 Constitution, does not stand in light of serious 
scrutiny.  
 
C. The Political Character of Labour Law 
i. Labour Law as a Radical Political Project   
The twin argument of the national origin of social law in Mexico is that it was a 
politically radical program at its inception. The inclusion of workers’ rights in Article 123 
is portrayed as the result of a winner-take-all victory and the institutionalization of a 
radical program. The most notable labour law scholars in the country have certainly 
contributed to this idea, weaving a narrative of a legal regime with huge emancipatory 
potential.  
 
According to several accounts, Article 123 was the triumph of the radical legislators 
over the conservatives in Congress.74 However, the most important triumph for the 
radicals was not the definition of the rights’ content, which were already envisioned for a 
subsequent labour statute, but instead their inclusion in the Constitution itself. Although 
there seemed to be considerable agreement in the Assembly over the need to legislate 
workers’ rights, their constitutionalisation was perceived as innovative and radical at the 
time.  
 
There was a heated debate in the Constitutional Assembly about whether workers’ 
rights should be included in the Constitution. Many thought it was enough to grant 
Congress the constitutional powers to legislate on labour regulation and argued for letting 
Congress pass a labour statute later.75 This position represented the view originally 
supported by Venustiano Carranza, the drafters of the Project of the Constitution and the 
faction of the renovators. This coalition was strongly opposed by a handful of radical 
Congressmen. In one of the most cited passages of the debates, Heriberto Jara argued:  
 
[T]he jurists, the publicists, the general experts of legislation, will 
probably find ridiculous this proposition: How would a Constitution 
                                                
74 De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 343. 
75 Fernando de Lizardi , UNAM Law School’s Dean, initiated the debate by arguing against the inclusion of 
the new paragraph into the Constitution. He claimed it was unnecessary, as it was a set of  “very good 
desires that will find an adequate place in Article 73 [stipulating Congress’ powers] as a general basis for 
Congress to later legislate labour matters.” Rouaix, Genesis 77. 
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include maximum work hours? How would it point out that the individual 
should not work more than 8 hours a day? That, according to them, is 
impossible; that, in their opinion, pertains to the regulation of [ordinary] 
laws. But precisely, what has this theory done? That our Constitution, so 
liberal, so broad, so good, had resulted in, as the Scientifics call it, ‘a suit 
of lights for the Mexican people’, because that regulation was never 
passed. … The eight-hour work-day … is to guarantee the freedom of 
individuals, it is precisely to guarantee their lives, to guarantee their 
energies, because until now Mexican workers have only been subject to 
exploitation.76 
 
Several representatives delivered passionate speeches supporting this motion.77 A 
position to include workers’ rights in the Constitution, even to create a whole new title, 
gathered momentum.78 When this trend seemed irreversible, Carranza commissioned 
representative José Natividad Macías to support the creation of a special constitutional 
section for labour.79 Macías had previously elaborated a labour code commissioned by 
Carranza, which was then the basis for what would become Article 123.80 
 
The achievement of the radical faction in the Assembly consisted not so much in the 
content of workers’ rights but in their inclusion in the Constitution. The radicals wished 
to enshrine what they saw as a key promise of the revolution, probably out of distrust that 
a future labour code would pass. This accomplishment should not be belittled. As can be 
gleaned from the constitutional debate, there was considerable opposition by the legal 
elite amongst the Congressmen. The radical faction succeeded in doing something that 
seemed unorthodox for the liberal jurists at that time; in defying the liberal constitutional 
models available, the radical Congressmen prioritized substance over form and succeeded 
in constitutionalizing workers’ rights.  
 
Labour scholars have made two common claims about the progressiveness of Mexican 
labour law that form part of the traditional narrative: first, that labour law had radical 
objectives and would inaugurate a new social and economic order; and, second, that these 
radical goals reached their apex during the government of President Lázaro Cárdenas 
(1934-1940), what is conceived of as the golden era for the legacy of the 1910 
                                                
76 Rouaix, Genesis 77-78. This passage is cited in every labour law book. See De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 
49, Nestor de Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 343-352, Trueba-Urbina, Derecho Social 47-48. 
77 Hector Victoria, the representative of the state of Yucatán, a state that had already enacted a labour 
legislation” including “maximum daily hours, minimum wages, weekly rest, health in the factories and 
mines, industrial agreements, creation of tribunals of conciliation and arbitration, prohibition of evening 
work for women and children, accidents, insurances, compensation, etc.” Rouaix, Genesis 80. 
78 This position was advanced by Froylán Manjarrez, arguing that he did not “care whether this 
Constitution adjusts to the models foreseen by the jurists…what I care about is that we attend the clamour 
of the men that participated in the armed struggle and deserve that we look for their welfare … Let us not 
fear that our Constitution be a little bad in its form … let’s go to the substance of the question.” Rouaix, 
Genesis 81; Diario de los Debates del Congreso Constituyente, 1916-1917 (Mexico, 1960) 986. 
79 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 50. 
80 Nestor de Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 345-46. 
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Revolution.81 After Cárdenas, the story goes, these principles were subverted or betrayed 
by subsequent administrations and by the leadership of the labour movement.   
 
De la Cueva was one of the most fervent advocates of the progressive character of 
labour law and its radical goals. He referred to the creation of social law as: 
 
[T]he revolution of equality as a guarantee of liberty, dignity, and welfare 
for all human beings, a political and juridical system in which the 
Aristotelian phrase of justice  “to give to every one his own” is substituted 
by the Marxist formula  “to give to every one what he needs.”82 
 
According to this view, labour law was a major victory for the working class. It was 
not only a protectionist law, but also created a status-based law of the working class.83 
Article 123 stood for the elimination of the liberal distinction between private and public 
law, and for the creation of social law, which would give legal force to labour’s struggle 
against exploitation and for social justice.84 
  
Labour law scholars share nostalgia for labour law’s presumed original radical aims 
and for their golden era under president Cárdenas’s government. Cárdenas’ support for 
the labour movement is praised and widely acknowledged.85 Scholars point to the end of 
Cárdenas’ government as the turning point in the labour system.86 After the Cárdenas 
administration, the government began deradicalising and weakening labour unions, 
enabling the ratification of national unity agreements and demobilising the transformative 
character of the labour movement.87 For instance, the Confederation of Mexican Workers 
(CTM) – the largest labour organization ever in the country created with Cárdenas’ 
support – substituted its radical slogan, “For a society without classes,” with the more 
moderate one. “For the emancipation of Mexico.”88 Labour scholars are both nostalgic 
                                                
81 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho; De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo; Trueba-Urbina, Derecho Social. 
82 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho LI.  
83 Ibid. 
84 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho LVIII. Although scholars agreed on the progressiveness of labour law and 
saw it as a direct challenge to the liberal legal and economic order, they did not advance identical positions 
about labour law’s objectives. Take, for instance, De la Cueva and Trueba-Urbina. While De la Cueva 
seemed to regard labour law as a powerful instrument to mediate between capital and labour within 
capitalism, Trueba-Urbina saw in labour law an institution that would set in motion a radical transformation 
away from capitalism and towards socialism. De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 85; Trueba-Urbina, Derecho 
Social 290-91; see also ibid 121-122, 235. 
85 De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho LX, De Buen, Derecho de trabajo 372; Trueba-Urbina  
86 De Buen asserts,“[W]ith Cárdenas concludes the process of fundamental social reforms.” After Cárdenas, 
Mexico “takes a definite route toward capitalism. It is not a classic liberal capitalism. … It is a capitalism 
integrated on one hand with private resources and on the other, with an important state intervention …with 
certain social direction.” De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 376.  This transition begins in 1940, only nine 
years after the enactment of the first federal Labour law in 1931. 
87 De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 381. 
88 De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 382. The CTM’s original manifesto clearly expressed its socialist aims, 
declaring the abolition of the capitalist system as a mid-term goal. Ibid 375. 
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for Cárdenas’ golden age and disillusioned by the de-radicalization of organized labour 
and of the labour regime in general.89 
 
ii. Labour Law as a Political Compromise  
Analyzing the constitutional debates in the 1916-1917 Assembly and the developments 
that led to Article 123, a different story is available: the labour regime did not emerge as 
a truly radical project that then declined and demobilized, as prominent labour scholars 
have argued, but, rather, it was a non-radical compromise from its inception. Pastor 
Rouaix, who chaired the Commission in charge of writing workers’ rights’ special title in 
the Constitution, provides a detailed account of this compromise.90 The preparatory work 
for the article generated heated debates before reaching a final decision.91 The outcome, 
according to Rouaix, was a compromise between the opposing factions participating in 
the Constitutional Assembly: “the meetings … were the fraternal amalgam of Jacobins 
and moderates, renovators and military men, Carrancists and Obregonists, united by one 
sole flag: the flag of fatherland.”92  
 
Rouaix’s book sought to set the historical record straight after the publication of two 
books written by representatives in the Constitutional Congress.93 Both books’ authors 
claimed credit for its respective faction for the social reforms implemented in the 1917 
Constitution.94 That these authors could each appropriate the outcome of the Constitution 
– to some extent true – further confirms that Article 123 was a compromise between 
competing factions that suited both the “renovators” – whose leader was the main author 
of that Article – and the “radicals.” 95  
 
                                                
89 See Trueba-Urbina, Derecho Social 124, De la Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 45 (complaining about the 
betrayal of labour law’s goals and wondering if labour law would ever have the courage of its convictions); 
De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 379.   
90 Rouaix, Genesis 105. Rouaix, a member of Carranza’s cabinet, justifies his selection as chair of this 
commission by the trust he inspired in Congress: “[I]n the radicals because they knew his past performance 
as eminently liberal and revolutionary; in the military, because as Governor of the state of Durango … he 
was one of the men who took up arms for the revolution; in the renovators and moderates for his civilian 
condition and for his adhesion to Mr Carranza.” Ibid. 
91 Some representatives introduced concepts of  “alarming radicalism,” but the Committee sought 
agreement by consensus. Rouaix, Genesis 106. 
92 Rouaix, Genesis 240. (emphasis added). Rouaix claims two alliances emerged at the outset in the 
Constitutional Congress: (1) moderates or “renovators” who recognized Venustiano Carranza as leader and 
Commander-in-Chief, represented in the Constitutional Congress by five former Congress representatives 
under Porfirio Diaz’ dictatorship, and (2) radicals, grouped around General Álvaro Obregón, formed by 
military men who had fought the revolution, surrounded by young representatives. Ibid 229. 
93 See ibid 229-240. 
94 Ibid 229-240. These books are Chronicle of the Constitutional Congress by Juan de Dios Bojórquez, a 
leftist and friend and supporter of Obregón, and History of the 1917 Constitution by Felix F. Palavacini, 
“reformer” who supported Carranza. Ibid 231. 
95 Rouaix, Genesis 237, 239. Rouaix claims that both books distort the participation of the opposite faction 
to take credit for the final work. In contrast, his book reflects the impartiality of someone who served as a 
“loop of union between exalted extremes, which made possible a great creation.” Ibid 237. 
 23 
Additionally, Social Catholicism was an apparent influence in this ultimate 
compromise. The meetings took place at the chapel in the Bishop of Querétaro’s 
residence, where “the theoretical principles of Christianity, which so many times had 
been praised in that place, had their practical realization”96 That the Commission’s chair 
saw Article 123 as an application of the principles of Christianity, even in its most 
progressive articulation at that time, further suggests that the compromise was far from 
being a radical victory. 
 
Furthermore, even the labour movement’s golden era, under Cárdenas, looks less 
radical that what many scholars portray.97 Cárdenas can be read as explicitly forging a 
compromise position:  
 
The main action of the Revolution’s new phase is Mexico’s march toward 
socialism, movement that equally sidetracks from the anachronistic norms 
of classic liberalism and from those of communism.  
… 
Within this doctrine, the Mexican state is not limited to be a simple 
guardian of order, with tribunals to adjudicate according to the law of 
individuals; neither can it become the head of the national economy, rather 
it tends to turn into the regulator of the great economic phenomena 
registered in our regime of production and wealth distribution.98 
 
What Cárdenas calls socialism is, in his words, right in the middle of the two radical 
political options: liberal laissez-faire and communism. Cárdenas describes Mexico’s 
revolutionary path as a compromise between these two positions, in which a private 
property capitalist system is maintained and moderated through government intervention.  
 
Interestingly, the same scholars who assert Article 123 is a victory of a radical 
political position acknowledge Cardenas’ less than radical actions and legacy regarding 
labour unions. De Buen, for instance, claims that Cardenas’ legacy to the labour 
movement was the creation of a national labour confederation, the CTM, with a socialist 
orientation. He explains that Cárdenas created the CTM to weaken and replace the then 
largest labour confederation, the Mexican Regional Confederation of Workers (CROM), 
which was strongly associated with Cárdenas predecessor, former President Calles. Thus, 
Cárdenas needed a labour organization that would support his administration and his 
policies.99 De Buen notes that even though CTM had originally a Marxist orientation, it 
was never, not even at its creation, a combative union. Rather, the CTM “was born 
                                                
96 Ibid 104. 
97 For an analysis of different historical interpretations of Cárdenas’ legacy see Knight, Alan, “Cardenismo: 
Juggernaut or Jalopy?” (1994) 26 Journal of Latin American Studies 73-107 (arguing that Cardenismo had 
radical objectives but was institutionally weak and was hijacked by more moderate groups and by 
opponents). “After 1940, the key institutions of Cardenismo … hardly fulfilled the radical high hopes of the 
mid- I930s; nor, to put it another way, did they realise the lively fears of businessmen and conservatives.” 
Idem. 
98 Navarrete, Alfredo, Alto a la Contrarrevolución (Testimonios de Atlacomulco) (Mexico, Editorial Libros 
de Mexico 1971) 11. 
99 De Buen, Derecho del Trabajo 372. 
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demobilized,” since it was Cardenas’ instrument to fight CROM’s political force.100 De 
Buen concludes that Cardenas’ formidable work is not exempt from errors: “[H[is love 
for labour unity led him to create an organism that was later to represent the most 
negative aspect of the labour movement.”101 
 
Employers accused Cárdenas of being communist.102 As a response, in his labour 
policy agenda, Cárdenas explicitly rejected the influence of any communist groups in his 
administration, argued for the need to create a single worker’s organization to end 
industrial conflict, reinforced the role of the government as arbitrator of social life, and 
stressed that workers’ demands would always be considered within the margins of firms’ 
economic possibilities.103  
 
 A final word about the labour movement before Cárdenas‘s administration is in order. 
Scholars refer to the syndicalist group “La Casa del Obrero Mundial” as combative and 
with revolutionary aspirations until its leaders made an agreement with Venustiano 
Carranza in 1914 to join the Revolution.104 De Buen notes that “in that moment, the 
demobilized unionism was born.”105 During the period from Carranza to Cárdenas (1917-
1934) the cooptation of unions, or their corporatist alliance with the government, and 
their transformation into political instruments was accomplished.106  
 
These accounts provide a picture of a labour movement at odds with the radical 
character that labour law scholars often project onto the past. While there were clearly 
radical elements in the labour movement, it seems that right after the Revolution, most 
unions came into the fold and compromised with the state. They forewent their radical 
aspirations in exchange for government protection and benefits. Cárdenas’ golden era 
seemed to have continued this corporatist logic. Even if he was pro-labour, as Cárdenas 
undoubtedly was, he successfully created the CTM to consolidate his political power. The 
CTM stands today, as the monument to corporatism and official unionism, far removed 
from any progressive agenda.  
iii. A Typology of the Political Character of Social Law  
The compromising character of the “social” was not limited to the case of Mexico.107 
Moreover, critiques of classical liberalism seeking to reconstruct the legal system around 
the idea of the social were not necessarily associated with the left or the right. The term 
                                                
100 Ibid 375. 
101 Ibid 376. 
102 Ibid.  
103 Ibid 373-75. 
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid 365. 
106 De Buen classifies unions into moderate and submissive “yellow-dog” unions and the anarchist “red” 
anarchist, which regarded the state as the handmaiden of the bourgeoisie set out to ensure capitalist 
exploitation. President Calles would effectively incorporate the “red” unions into the National 
Revolutionary Party – later the PRI – in 1929. Ibid. 
107 See Kennedy, Duncan and Belleau, Marie-Claire, François Gény aux États-Unis, in Thomasset, Claude, 
et al, eds, François Gény, Mythe Et Realités, (Yvon Blais 2000). 
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“social” could be claimed by anyone not associated with Marxism or liberalism.108 
Indeed, the strength of the social was that it did not associate ideologically with the 
political divisions of the time.109 As to the role of the State, the social favoured equally a 
reconstruction through the State and a reconstruction through civil society. Thus, the 
social encompasses two divergent positions with regard to the question of labour: one 
position for social regulation by the State, and another in opposition to State 
regulation.110 
 
The nature of the social compromise in Mexico was a progressive move from the old 
classical, liberal legal and economic regime, not a conservative one. It was a corporatist 
project, but it was not fascist. It was decidedly not a radical project; it was far from being 
a communist program or to even contain the seeds of it. The groups that did not 
participate in the reconstruction of the legal order through the State were those who 
represented the old, liberal capitalist system associated with Diaz’s regime and those who 
wanted a communist regime. The reconstruction was also a secular compromise, not a 
religious one. The groups that desired a reconstruction through civil society and opposed 
the State remained at the fringe. This includes groups from both the left and the right. On 
the left, anarchist groups regarded the State as perpetually in alliance with the dominant 
capitalist class that oppressed workers and peasants. On the right, Catholic groups 
resented the State for limiting the role of the Church in public and private affairs, and for 
limiting religious expression while propagating a secular ideology. These groups entered 
into conflict with the State at different points following the 1917 Constitution, as the new 
compromise was consolidating.  
D. Explaining the Traditional Narrative 
If these critiques are plausible, two questions emerge: First, why did these scholars argue 
so adamantly for the national and radical character of labour law? Second, why does it 
matter? I see at least three main projects furthered by this narrative.  
 
(1) The professional project. These scholars created a new field in legal scholarship – 
labour law – and at the same time claimed to be renovating the whole legal system 
around the idea of social law. This project opened up space for progressive scholars and 
situated them at the vanguard of an otherwise formalistic and doctrinal private law 
scholarship.111 These scholars became the standard-bearers of a fully-fledged renovation 
of the legal system.  
 
                                                
108 Ibid 300. 
109 Ibid; see also Kennedy, Duncan “From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon 
Fuller’s ‘Consideration and Form’” (2000) 100 Columbia Law Review 94 119-120 (arguing that before 
World War I social reconstruction did not require the adoption of communist or fascist versions of 
collectivism because neither yet existed as a developed theory or practice of state power). 
110 Kennedy and Belleau, François Gény 301; see also Kennedy, Will Theory, 119-120. 
111 Nevertheless, private law was also being socialized. See Galindo Garfias, Ignacio, Estudios de Derecho 
Civil (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico 1981); De Buen, Néstor, La Decadencia del Contrato 
(Editorial Porrúa 2000). 
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This professional project emerged from a theoretical and doctrinal breakthrough 
adopted, crafted and claimed as theirs in the domestic legal academy. To gauge the 
impact on these scholars’ professional careers consider the case of De la Cueva, who 
became not only a renowned legal scholar but also a public intellectual and a government 
advisor. Labour law became a springboard into constitutional law, legal theory and legal 
philosophy.112 Founding the field of labour law marked the beginning of a stellar 
professional career. He became President of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
Mexico (UNAM) in 1936-1942, Dean of the UNAM Law School in 1952-54, and later 
Emeritus Professor of Law, and Doctor Honoris Causa. De la Cueva received, from the 
President of Mexico, the 1978 National Prize of Arts and Sciences in History, Social 
Sciences, and Philosophy. He is also revered as a professor and remembered as a mentor 
by many law students who would later become legal scholars, writers, and politicians. 
Thus, De la Cueva’s creation of the labour law field, along with other renowned scholars, 
can be seen as an effort to forge a professional project, which involved a serious 
intellectual agenda and a claim to expertise, a career ambition in the legal academy and 
state institutions, and a desire to influence his peers as well as future generations.   
 
(2) The political project. Labour scholars intervened in the national questions about 
distribution of wealth and power. Questions such as how to organize relations of 
production between business and workers, how to allocate power between capital and 
labour, and what the state’s role should be in mediating among them and through which 
institutions should the state intervene. De la Cueva, for instance, drafted the project for 
the sentence of the Supreme Court’s Labour Law Chamber that was the basis for the oil 
companies’ expropriation decree by President Lázaro Cárdenas. He was also Chair of the 
Commission that wrote the second federal labour statute, enacted in 1970, which was an 
effort to reinvigorate worker protections and renovate some of the redistributive and 
transformative aspirations that De la Cueva believed had stagnated.  
 
Notably, the political project can be seen as facilitated by the professional one, with 
its claim to authoritative knowledge and expertise. The professional project is also a 
struggle for the prevalence and influence of ideas that are deemed to have better 
economic and social consequences in society. For De la Cueva, labour law was not only a 
new discipline but also, and perhaps primarily, a new tool for the social and economic 
transformation of the country.  
 
(3) The transnational project. This is a project that seeks to establish a new 
relationship of equals between the geopolitical periphery, where Mexico is situated, and 
the centre. In this case, De la Cueva and other labour scholars attempted to establish this 
relationship by arguing that Mexico had transcended, or anticipated, Europe.113 They 
                                                
112 De la Cueva was the first scholar in Mexico to publish a book on labour law (1934). Later, he translated 
Herman Heller’s book on Sovereignty: A Contribution To a Legal Theory of the State and International 
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113 For an incisive analysis of the appeal to identity in the project of nation-building, to provide social 
cohesion and justify a domestic political project see Geertz, Clifford, The Integrative Revolution: 
Primordial Sentiments and Politics in the New States, in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for 
Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York, Free Press of Glencoe 1963) 105-157 (“[P]eoples of the new 
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claimed the genesis of social rights and pointed to the 1917 Constitution as the first 
“social” constitution in the world. De la Cueva asserts, “We can affirm that life 
anticipated doctrine, because in 1917 … the first Declaration of Social Rights in history 
was proclaimed in Querétaro [México], and two years later in Weimar.”114 
 
This claim lent enormous credibility to the national project of reconstruction. 
Furthermore, claiming that the project was progressive enabled these legal scholars to 
advocate for progressive politics in the Mexico by reference to the Constitution. It was a 
claim of progressive originalism. When new questions of interpretation arose, they could 
argue that the Constitution required the progressive one.   
 
This would not be the first time that legal scholars participated in creating a narrative 
of national pride. For example, in many of the newly independent states in Latin America 
in the nineteenth century, legal elites claimed a specific uniqueness or identity for their 
country that preceded the Spanish colonialists and differentiated the new nation from 
Spain. This uniqueness allowed them to claim a place in the concert of nations as an 
independent and sovereign entity and provided cohesion for the domestic project.115 
Legal scholars in several Latin American countries were actively involved in defending 
the sovereignty of their countries. They were busy creating new legal doctrines that 
would allow their countries to be shielded from threats of foreign intervention. These 
doctrinal innovations were touted as coming out of the new countries, belonging to the 
tradition of, while simultaneously renewing, international law.116 Thus, these scholars 
would claim that Latin American international law had contributed something original to 
the discipline, demanding recognition as peers in the international arena. This claim 
allowed them to legitimate the projects of their national governments at home.   
 
Although these three projects are analytically distinct, they are no doubt intermingled. 
For instance, in De la Cueva’s case, these projects reinforce each other in important 
ways. The transnational project advocating a historic national contribution seems 
instrumental to enable his professional and political projects domestically. International 
                                                                                                                                            
states are simultaneously animated by two powerful … motives … – the desire to be recognized as 
responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions ‘matter,’ and the desire to build an efficient, 
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political order, greater social justice, and beyond that of ‘playing a part in the larger arena of world 
politics,’ of ‘exercising influence among the nations.’”); see also Hosbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger, 
Terence, eds, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press 1983); Weber, Max, The Nation, in 
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114 De La Cueva, Nuevo Derecho 71. 
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recognition gives credence to De la Cueva’s professional aspirations and opens the space 
for political intervention at home.  
 
So why is it important to problematize the traditional narrative and to show its biases, 
make-beliefs and contradictions? In my view, there are at least two compelling reasons. 
First, it has the potential to render the three projects – professional, political and 
transnational – visible and, thus, open them up for contestation. Challenging the 
traditional labour law narrative may open the field to new ways of thinking about labour 
relations. The challenge may also foster legal institutional imagination and policy 
innovation.  
 
Second, questioning the traditional narrative may enable a clearer analysis of the 
consequences of the status quo. At one level, the analysis may illuminate who wins and 
who loses under the current narrative – whose professional and political projects are 
advanced and whose are hindered. At another level, the challenge may facilitate a more 
concrete analysis of the consequences of the labour law regime in place by examining 
how specific rules and institutions affect the distribution of wealth and power in society.  
 
In the past, social law advocates failed to engage with a number of important critiques 
to social legislation, coming from all sides of the political spectrum. Feminists challenged 
labour regulation for its gender bias, creating a division of labour that relegated women to 
the household and left them out of the market. When women did enter the market, they 
were discriminated against with fewer opportunities and lower wages.117 A liberal 
critique challenged the corporatist character of social law, noting that the labour law 
regime relied on an alliance between the government, employers and official unions that 
impinged on worker liberty, and led union leaders to disregard the interests of the rank 
and file, focusing instead in obtaining personal and political benefits in exchange for 
agreements.118 Social theorists and social movements challenged the social law regime of 
the welfare state as a statist, bureaucratic system of social control in the service of liberal 
capitalism. The labour law regime, worked to create an obedient working class that was 
trained to respect authority and accept its limited and subordinated role in decisions of 
economic production and distribution.119 Finally, neoclassical economists challenged 
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labour regulation as a barrier to job creation, firms’ competitiveness and economic 
growth.120     
Some of these critiques are more warranted than others, and their veracity depends on 
each particular context.121 They are critiques of social law and of labour regulation by 
advocates on the left and on the right of the political spectrum. What they have in 
common is that they are consequentialist. They focus on labour regulation’s effects on 
different groups of workers: female workers, youth, non-unionized or informal workers; 
on workers’ subjectivity and their role in society; on workers’ ability to be represented; 
on employers; and on the economy as a whole.  
Defending social law – or labour rights – as a national asset and as the achievement of 
a revolutionary struggle or as a fundamental pillar in the Constitution are ways to justify 
a social law regime without addressing its effects. In this way, advocates for labour miss 
an opportunity to evaluate the consequences of the labour regulation they defend and to 
engage with critics on their own terms. Once the national identity argument is put aside, 
new opportunities to both defend some aspects of the current regime and to re-imagine it 
become apparent.  
The critiques of the use of national identity and of the assumption that social law in 
Mexico is progressive may serve as a warning against the romanticisation of social law as 
a transformative project. Mexico shows that identity-based and deontological arguments 
can be successful in creating national pride and mobilizing support for specific 
institutions; but they cannot justify a legal regime based on its effects. Moreover, these 
arguments might end up legitimating a regime that does not advance workers’ welfare.  
Currently in Mexico, many progressives resist the neoliberal flexibility program by 
invoking the achievements of the revolution and the 1917 Mexican Constitution. They 
assert that the current legal and constitutional framework has a progressive character that 
can help resist calls to dismantle current labour market regulation. As I have examined, 
however, treating social law as having an inherently progressive character is not 
historically warranted in the case of Mexico. When progressives retrench behind national 
pride or constitutional rights’ arguments to resist the neoliberal flexibility reform they 
implicitly concede too much. When their main line of defence is that workers’ rights 
cannot be touched, they concede that the economic effects of current labour law regime 
might as well be negative but that they do not have an answer to that challenge. 
Moreover, this line of defence also makes it harder to think of imaginative, progressive 
alternatives to current market regulation.  
On the other hand, those advocating for neoliberal flexibility reform increasingly use 
the malleable social law discourse to make their case. In Mexico, this is most evident in 
the PRI bill, which argues that flexibility reforms are necessary to help workers.122 The 
bill claims that the historical achievements of the Revolution and workers’ rights 
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consecrated in the Constitution will remain untouched.123 It is perhaps fitting for the PRI 
to advance such reform. After all, it is the party that institutionalized the national 
revolution and used that discourse to legitimate its rule. Now, having been out of power 
for twelve years, the PRI is trying to craft a compromise between employers’ associations 
and unions. Despite its rhetoric, however, this compromise is likely not to benefit most 
workers.  
A striking feature of the PRI bill is that it frames a neoliberal flexibility program for 
market regulation as a social law program. Thus, the PRI bill maintains that greater 
flexibility in hiring and firing is necessary to help create jobs, particularly for women and 
youth, and to promote competitiveness, productivity and growth.124 PRI promotes these 
reforms while claiming that it is motivated by the historical achievements of enshrining 
workers rights in the Constitution, which will continue to guide labour market regulation. 
At best, this bill is a promise to legalize the status quo.  
E. Implications of the Mexican Story for Debates in Other Countries  
The Mexican story offers several valuable lessons for labour law debates in other 
countries. First, Mexico shows that, despite is traditional association with progressive 
politics, the social is politically indeterminate. As an international phenomenon, social 
law took different political valences in different countries, from left to right in the 
political spectrum and from democratic to authoritarian forms of government. 
 Second, Mexico shows that arguments based on national identity and 
constitutional rights face serious problems. These arguments often fail to diagnose the 
effects of current labour market regulation, offer no response to consequentialist critiques 
of current regulation and offer no proposals for reimagining labor regulation to increase 
workers’ wellbeing. Consequently, if neoliberals promote a flexibility reform couched on 
social law ideals, pro-labour advocates have a hard time offering an alternative program.  
Third, the social was in fact a truly global phenomenon, despite claims that it was 
unique to and created by each country where it was introduced. This is important to keep 
in mind, because the arguments of national identity and constitutional rights considerably 
constrain the analysis to a specific country. Taking seriously the social’s transnational 
character would help to analyze that country’s situation in the global economy, thinking 
of how it is affected by its place in the world market and its relationship with other 
countries.  
In the next section, I explore the relevance of the insights from Mexico for 
contemporary debates about labour regulation elsewhere, specifically in Europe. The 
effects of market economic integration in the EU and the perceived hampering of social 
provisions in the Member States have sparked a debate about the need to ensure the 
preservation of basic social protections as part of the Union. This debate has been framed 
in terms of identity and the allegedly inherent progressiveness of social law. I will 
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examine parallels between Europe case and Mexico and use the insights gained from the 
case of Mexico to raise some caveats.  
II. National Identity in Current Debates about Social Regulation in Europe 
In Europe, the social position has also been articulated on identity terms at the regional 
level. Advocates and scholars associate the creation of “Social Europe” with values that 
are considered indigenous to the Union and, therefore, must be defended on those terms. 
This is not limited to social regulation; these arguments are also advanced in private law, 
as it is visible in the debate about harmonization and the call for a “common core” that 
reflects European social values.125   
Simultaneously, at the national level, advocates of social regulation resort to a similar 
identity argument to defend their welfare state’ worker protections and social insurance 
programs against what is perceived as menacing European economic integration model. 
In this view, the EU’s market-oriented policies threaten the existence of the welfare state 
and, with it, something fundamental about the nation’s identity. This national level 
pushback against the EU model may be particularly acute now in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis.  
This is not to say that all social position arguments are premised upon national or 
regional identity; however, these arguments remain powerful and thus, deserve critical 
scrutiny. For progressives, the obvious upside of defending social law on the basis of 
identity is that it provides an easy and energizing point of resistance. The problem is that 
identity conjures up essences and obfuscates trade-offs and distributional consequences. 
It also portrays the status quo as desirable and makes it harder to articulate alternatives to 
the existing law that could potentially better meet progressives’ underlying interests and 
goals. Lastly, the emphasis on national identity eschews analysis of social regulation’s 
implication in transnational problems with transnational constituencies.126 
A. The Use of Identity and the Push to Constitutionalize Social Rights 
Since the start of the European integration project after World War II, whether and how 
to regulate social policy at the supranational level has remained a central question.  
Progressives in Europe have widely used identity arguments to promote a social rights 
agenda, which is evident in the debates over “Social Europe.” Take, for instance, the 
debate over the contents of a potential European Constitution, which was in the works in 
the early 2000s.127 Similar to Mexico, identity was a key force mobilizing the 
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establishment of social rights. European progressives argued that European identity was 
closely connected to the “social” because of the history of welfare protection in Member 
States, and, thus, constitutionalizing this social identity was the way forward for the EU. 
Jurgen Habermas famously asked for the constitutionalization of Europe’s social self. 
He argued that it was these values, in part, that set Europe apart from the rest of the world 
and which could provide the necessary glue for the further integration that was sorely 
needed in the face of unfettered globalization: 
In Western Europe … the political tradition of the workers’ movement, the 
salience of Christian social doctrines and even a certain normative core of 
social liberalism still provide a formative background for social solidarity. 
In their public self-representations, Social and Christian Democratic 
parties in particular support inclusive systems of social security and a 
substantive conception of citizenship, which stresses what John Rawls 
calls ‘the fair value’ of equally distributed rights. In terms of a 
comparative cultural analysis, we might speak of the unique European 
combination of public collectivisms and private individualism.128 
Miguel Maduro, who later served as Advocate General in the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), called on the EU to initiate an open discussion on its “social identity” and 
its “social self” in the constitutional debates. Maduro noted the “subsidiary and under-
developed nature of Europe’s social citizenship when compared with its original market 
citizenship” and argued that whatever social rights the EU had granted its citizens, it had 
done so by virtue of the economic value of these citizens rather than respect for their 
basic dignity.129 His account of why Europe needed to constitutionalize the “social” 
explicitly relied on identity: 
Simply stated, Europe must, as Kierkegaard would say, discuss its 
identity. … As it now stands, and in Kierkegaard’s terms, it faces despair: 
the despair of wanting to be oneself and the despair of not wanting to be 
oneself. I do not know the resolution but I believe that future 
developments of the Union depend on a discussion of this identity or, 
perhaps better, on a discussion of its underlying social contract. … To 
ignore this “social identity question” in the forthcoming constitutional 
debates of the European Union may well correspond to the dangerous path 
of which Kierkegaard warned: “The biggest danger, that of losing oneself, 
can pass off in the world as quietly as if it were nothing; every other loss, 
an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc., is bound to be noticed.”130 
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These positions share a reaction to the negative consequences of market integration in 
Europe and an identity-based project of building “Social Europe” as way to include social 
values in a future European Constitution.131 The aim was that, once constitutionalized, 
social rights could provide the social insurance and solidarity mechanisms to reshape 
economic integration. Social rights would thus achieve equal status with the economic 
freedoms and the efficiency rationale thus far driving the integration process.132  
B. Identity as Resistance 
Just as social progressives in Mexico use the supposedly close connection between 
national identity and the “social” to resist neoliberal reforms, social progressives in 
individual European states also resisted the process of further Europeanization through 
appeal to national identity.  
Take, for instance, the French “no” campaign against the Constitutional Treaty. The 
campaign referenced the danger that the imagined low-wage immigrant, such as the 
“Polish plumber,” constituted for the French social model and the danger that expansion 
to the East would constitute for French identity.133 A group of entrepreneurs intervening 
in favour of the “yes” vote felt compelled to answer the appeal to national identity. They 
argued that a France weakened by a “no” vote would have less influence in the 
deliberation over the European social model and would not be as able to push for the 
fundamental values of French society at the European level.134 Economist Frédéric 
Lordon reproached the “yes” camp for failing to note that “the social State and public 
services [are] … fundamental elements of political and symbolic French grammar” and, 
thus, “[France] can’t renounce them under any circumstances.”135  
National identity defences of the social welfare model has been even stronger in 
certain Scandinavian countries, where national identity has been constructed in close 
connection with the welfare state.136 Writing on the Nordic model, Mary Hilson notes 
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that “the welfare state is still regarded as an integral part of the meaning of 
Scandinavia.”137 The difference Scandinavian countries perceive between themselves as 
an “egalitarian social democratic community of destiny” and the “capitalist and Catholic 
European continent” fuels opposition to European integration.138 This identity-based 
defence of the welfare model has also resulted in a xenophobic discourse that specifically 
singles out foreigners as a potential burden to the generous welfare regimes of the 
north.139  
While the project of national resistance may share the objective of social protection 
with those seeking to Europeanize social rights through treaty incorporation, it does not 
share their optimism that regionalization of social policy would be effective or ultimately 
beneficial. It is not surprising that some of the most vociferous opposition has taken place 
in countries with robust welfare systems, which fear that these hard-fought protections 
would be eroded. Remarkably, both groups use identity as a strategy to mobilize their 
agenda. At the regional level, social advocates mobilize European identity to propose a 
positive program of reform in the EU treaty and institutions; other social advocates 
mobilize national identity to resist the further encroachment of EU law on their national 
social protections.  
C. Identity to What Effect?  
Social progressives’ call for the Europeanization of social rights was partly answered by 
the Constitutional Treaty, which ultimately failed, and the Lisbon Treaty, which largely 
replicated the Constitutional Treaty’s provisions, and was accepted and entered into 
force. The Lisbon Treaty also incorporated by reference the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which includes a series of social rights, even though it explicitly excludes an 
interpretation that would widen the scope of the EU’s competences.140 Moreover, on 
social policy, the EU is said to be a “social market economy” 141 striving for “smart, 
sustainable, and inclusive growth,”142 while the European welfare states are featured in 
the Commission’s reports as a “productive factor” rather than as an impediment to 
growth.143   
What have been the effects of the inclusion of social policy in the EU? I suggest that 
the relevance of social policy language in EU law has been tested in two crucial ways. 
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The first test has taken the form of a string of highly controversial cases in the ECJ, 
where national collective bargaining regulations were in tension with EU economic 
freedom rights. The second test has been provided by the ongoing Euro financial crisis 
and the European response to tackle it. At a moment of crisis, how the rescue program 
takes shape would reveal how substantive the commitments to social protection are and 
whether the social agenda’s aspiration to reshape Europe’s economic integration has any 
chance to succeed. So far, the evidence, although not the rhetoric, seems to suggest 
otherwise.144 
First, a new phase in the resistance to Europeanization began after a series of 
decisions by the ECJ between 2007 and 2008 created intense anxiety about the future of 
the Nordic model, especially regarding collective bargaining.145 The Viking case,  in 
which a Finnish ship sought to reflag under an Estonian flag in order to lower its labour 
costs, provoked strong reactions.146 The ECJ ruled that industrial action aimed at stopping 
an undertaking from exercising its freedom of establishment was a prima facie violation 
of the Treaties. Worker protection was a legitimate goal in the industrial action of the 
union, but it would have to be established by the national courts that specific jobs were in 
danger, and that there were not in fact less restrictive means for achieving this goal. All 
of these requirements were novel for the national labour law regimes. 
In the Laval case, a Latvian construction company undertook work in Sweden for 
which it posted Latvian workers to Sweden.147 The local Swedish union began 
negotiations with Laval in order to set the wage rates for the Latvian workers. The 
Swedish industrial relations system leaves setting of wage rates to sector specific 
negotiations between management and labour. Laval, which had already signed a 
collective agreement including the setting of wages with a Latvian union, refused to sign 
onto the local collective agreement for the Swedish building sector. The agreement would 
have forced it to pay the Latvian workers rates much higher than it had planned. The 
Swedish union then blockaded Laval construction sites, and a secondary, sympathy 
boycott was undertaken by the local electricians’ union. This industrial action, which was 
legal in Sweden up until that point, was effective, and Laval had to back out of its 
contracts and declare bankruptcy in Sweden.  
The ECJ court decided that labour law as such was not outside the scope of Treaty 
provisions on free movement. Significantly, it recognized collective action as a 
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fundamental right to be exercised in accordance with the fundamental economic 
freedoms recognized by the Treaties. The court found that collective action limiting free 
movement of services, such as the one at stake, needed to be exercised for reasons of 
public interest and needed to be proportional to its legitimate end. Conceding that the 
protection of workers was a legitimate end, the Court nonetheless found that the specific 
industrial action had been disproportionate. 
These decisions prompted intense reactions from social progressives, particularly in 
Scandinavia.148 Even the European Economic and Social Committee urged the EU to 
strengthen its social protections at the constitutional level, advocating for a Treaty change 
to help balance social and economic rights.149 
Ulrich Muckenberger, who was involved with the 1997 “Manifesto for Social 
Europe” advocating for the constitutionalization of social values, urged a “Post Laval 
Social Manifesto,” claiming that the ECJ’s balancing of social rights against civil 
liberties was legally incorrect.150 According to this account, the inclusion of social rights 
in EU law has not made much of a difference because they remain subordinated to 
market access rights. This typically progressive stance, however, bears some analysis as 
well. More specifically, it would be important to analyze the consequences of these ECJ 
judgments beyond the formal, legal prevalence of one right over another.151 The language 
of social rights and “Social Europe” is equated with the wellbeing of all workers. But the 
cases show that the interests of Western and Eastern European workers may not be 
necessarily aligned – in fact, they can be at odds with one another. This does not mean 
that they cannot be made compatible, for example by establishing a minimum floor of 
labour standards throughout Europe and avoiding capital flight to other continents. It 
would be necessary, though, to show how that would be pursued. Otherwise, it would 
seem that European workers would be better-off had the ECJ decided these cases the 
opposite way; this glosses over conditions for workers in Eastern Europe and the social 
development prospects for the new EU members.  
Second, the EU has seemingly incorporated social policy in its formal response to the 
financial crisis.152 In response to the crisis, the EU implemented financial reform, 
financial stabilization, economic governance reforms, and measures to facilitate 
growth.153 Although securing a stable economy through economic governance reforms 
may help growth, this is unlikely to happen under stringent austerity measures. Because 
Member States do not have autonomy over their monetary policy and cannot devalue 
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their currency, they are experiencing considerable pressure to turn to labour law 
deregulation and to scale back workers’ protections as a strategy to address their fiscal 
woes. 154 At the same time, the EU’s 2020 strategy for growth would require significant 
government spending, which, given Member State’s indebtedness, seems unforeseeable. 
Of the EU responses, the Euro Plus Pact (EPP)155 and the Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) between the EU/IMF and countries under bailout assistance,156 
have had the greatest impact on national labour laws. Both the EPP and the MoU 
suggested that Member States reform their labour laws to ensure competitiveness and 
facilitate growth. The MoU, significantly more intrusive than the EPP, conditions the 
receipt of financial assistance on implementing labour law reforms.157 These reforms also 
have a disciplining effect on other countries in crisis, because they send a message that 
they, too, should deregulate their labour laws.158 After an analysis of the EU’s response to 
the financial crisis, Barnard concludes that:  
Traditionally, the EU has been seen as something of a bastion against 
deregulation at national level, and at least this body of directives continues 
to provide a floor of rights. Yet, now the EU – whether through the 
Council formations in the context of its recommendations in the integrated 
guidelines or at least the heads of state or government – has become 
responsible for the very deregulation it resisted for many years. Longer 
term, the EU may be responsible for precipitating a race to the bottom.159  
In the last two years, the Commission has promoted the goal of defending the 
“European social model” in its communications regarding the Euro crisis.160 The 
Economic and Social Committee also considers the European social model so unique that 
it should be promoted in Europe’s development assistance programs to poor countries.161   
However, the Lisbon Treaty’s inclusion of social rights and the enthusiasm about 
Social Europe indeed may not have made much difference in the EU’s response to the 
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euro crisis. On this front, the character of Social Europe must be measured against the 
effects of the austerity measures in each nation and how their costs and benefits are 
distributed between societal groups and among the Member States.  
As we have seen, the EU uses identity-based social justifications to pursue policies 
that might not qualify as progressive. Indeed, a number of progressive scholars have 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the direction of Social Europe in the last decade, 
especially considering the ECJ’s labour rights rulings.162 Even progressive supporters of 
the EU level were disillusioned after Laval.163 It is arguable that the EU’s seemingly 
neoliberal policies are now being pursued under the guise of “social” discourse.  
What have been the limits of using identity arguments to promote a social rights 
strategy to advance an economic agenda? Progressives in Europe quite successfully 
enshrined social rights in European treaty law, and promoted a Social Europe identity. So 
far, however, the results seem paltry at best. For example, during the recent Euro crisis, 
having adopted a Social Europe model does not seem to have made much difference. 
This opens social rights to the familiar critique of legitimation, claiming that they are 
enabling economic policies by reference to their compatibility to the social model, which 
would otherwise look less palatable. The European experience also shows that resorting 
to identity and social rights may obscure the distributional effects of policies on different 
kinds of workers; the insistence on preserving a set of social rights might limit the 
imagination of alternatives that may perhaps offer greater traction.   
III. Labour Reform and Economic Development: Thinking About Potential 
Alternatives  
New possibilities might open up if one thinks about labour regulation beyond its familiar 
associations, particularly in the case of Mexico. I have argued that the defence of current 
labour regulation in the name of revolutionary achievement, cultural pride or 
constitutional rights should no longer be sufficient without evidence of its social and 
economic benefits. When progressives cling to these arguments, they, perhaps 
inadvertently, concede too much. They concede that labour regulation is necessarily bad 
for firms, markets and the country’s growth prospects; they pass on an opportunity to 
challenge the powerful discourse of labour flexibility; and they forego a necessary 
diagnosis of the current problem. Thus, they surrender an invaluable opportunity to 
imagine alternatives. Their main strategy is resistance, and their only alternative is the 
defence of the mostly indefensible status quo.  
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Proponents of labour flexibility argue that rigid restrictions and compulsory clauses in 
the employment contract make it harder for firms to hire and fire, which in turn translates 
to less job creation, lower productivity and depressed economic growth. Progressives 
should re-appropriate the language and aspirations of labour flexibility. This should not 
only mean flexibility for employers to hire and fire at will, but also for workers. 
Progressives could promote an agenda that makes flexibility a means to turn the 
workplace into a meaningful life experience for millions of workers. Repetitive and 
deadening activities in factories and shops, with rigid hierarchies and little or no 
contribution of workers in firms’ productive decisions, is routine in many sectors of the 
Mexican economy.  
Too many firms rely on rigid and outdated systems of production and management. 
Flexibility could be a rallying cry to reform those modes of production. It could foster 
innovation by prioritizing learning and experimentation so that firms resemble schools 
and workers are encouraged to contribute ideas. Flexibility could change the hierarchical 
structure of firms from a rigid, vertical structure, to a horizontal one where employees 
work in teams and are required to participate in projects over which they have ownership 
and are encouraged to develop critical thinking and collaboration.164 Flexibility could 
mean a workplace where competition and cooperation channel work towards a common 
purpose and give workers an opportunity to realize themselves. That these goals seem 
unpractical or even utopian in Mexico says more about the rigidity of our firms’ 
management and systems of production than of the desirability or feasibility of these 
aspirations.   
Flexibility should also mean labour mobility. For too long, employers forewent their 
ability to fire, hire, and bargain over working conditions in return for industrial peace. 
They obtained stability and the return on their human capital investment by ensuring 
workers they had trained remained in the firm for their entire productive life. Workers 
sacrificed their aspiration to participation in management and production decisions – or 
even of ownership – and their ability to withhold their labour and disrupt production. 
Workers were promised secure, stable jobs that paid family wages and provided benefits. 
This bargain worked relatively well for many years when internal labour markets where 
dominant and the domestic economy was substantially shielded from global competition.  
No longer. If global economic and regulatory changes have fundamentally altered this 
bargain, progressives have an opportunity to contest these conditions and reshape the 
bargain. A cornerstone of the old bargain was permanent employment, sustained by a rule 
of just-cause dismissal. Given the new conditions of global economic competition, it 
makes increasingly less sense for progressives to look for security of workers at firm 
level in all sectors. Progressives could promote security of workers through helping them 
develop marketable skills – encouraging worker investment not in the firm, but in their 
own personal capabilities.165  
In the old bargain, compensation upon unjust dismissal provided a cushion for 
workers to make ends meet while they re-entered the labour market. This compensation 
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worked as the functional equivalent of unemployment insurance. Progressives could 
promote the establishment of universal unemployment insurance, paid by society as a 
whole through the tax system. The details of the insurance and policies to encourage 
labour market re-entry would need to be worked out, but this would protect workers 
against dismissal while giving firms the flexibility they demand. Workers would be less 
dependent on one particular firm and instead encouraged to invest in their skills for the 
market in general.  
Benefits, such as health care and pension funds, were a crucial aspect of the 
permanent employment relationship. This highlights the fact that labour regulation cannot 
be analyzed in a vacuum, but rather must be seen as part of a broader social bargain 
between capital, labour and the state, institutionalized as social security benefits. It is not 
surprising that workers would hang on to job security today because without a formal job 
they would lose accrued benefits and be deprived of social insurance. Furthermore, jobs 
with benefits, even in the formal economy, are increasingly hard to find. Once social 
insurance benefits like health insurance, pensions, childcare, workers’ compensation, and 
affordable housing are universally available to all citizens, job security becomes 
considerably less important.  
Portable skills without jobs are useless. These reforms would need to be paired with a 
concerted strategy to stimulate the economy and create jobs. Labour flexibility, as it is 
currently advanced, is no development strategy. Even though it is currently promoted as 
one of the pending structural reforms and a key that would open the door to firm’s 
competitiveness and job creation, it is hard to see how that would happen. At best, it is a 
strategy to increase firms’ productivity at the margins through reduction in labour costs 
and further precarisation of jobs. This is not a sustainable, long-term strategy for job 
creation, much less a strategy for economic growth.  
To see why the proposal of the dominant flexibility agenda is an illusion one needs to 
look no further than at how the labour market operates in practice – not simply what the 
law in the books says, but the rules governing everyday action. There is already rampant 
flexibility in the labour market. Many economic sectors are already quite flexible, where 
the employment contract restrictions in hiring and firing are honoured in the breach and 
benefits are not part of the contract. This de facto labour flexibility is sometimes achieved 
by breach. Sometimes it is by ingeniously bypassing the law, for example, by hiring 
workers through a third party. Furthermore, by some estimates, half of the labour force 
works in the informal economy, which is as flexible as it gets. Flexibility in labour costs 
can also be measured by looking at the dramatic decline in real wages in Mexico. Mexico 
has some of the lowest real wages in Latin America.166 Since the 1990s, the productivity 
gains resulting from declining labour costs have mostly gone to employers.   
To better diagnose the labour market, we must recognize that there are several labour 
law regimes that operate in the economy. Even though the applicable labour law is the 
same, its real hold varies. The likelihood of effective enforcement increases with the size 
and market relevance of firms, effective worker representation, probability of inspection 
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visits and expedited remedies by labour tribunals. Consider three different labour law 
regimes that I call “employee-friendly,” “employer-friendly” and “free-for-all.” 167 
In the employee-friendly regime, the current labour law is applied at its fullest. 
Employees work under permanent contracts and enjoy most benefits provided by law. 
This regime operates in a few economic sectors like manufacturing, mining and 
electricity, particularly medium-size and big firms. These are the traditionally unionized 
sectors, where workers often have effective representation and employers have an interest 
in preserving their investment in workers’ human capital by avoiding turnover. These are 
also the firms that are most visible and likely to be caught by inspectors or sued by 
workers if they break the law.  
In the employer-friendly regime, labour restrictions are loose and benefits scarce or 
non-existent. Limitations on hiring and firing are bypassed by outsourcing and by 
employing workers as independent contractors. Labour law is vastly underenforced or 
subverted by legal fictions and, given low levels of worker organisation, firms enjoy de 
facto labour flexibility. This regime is operative in many sectors including services, 
tourism and food preparation, and it is most prevalent in micro, small and medium size 
firms.  
The free-for-all regime is the informal economy, where labour law does not reach and 
where firms mostly operate entirely outside the regulatory framework. This is a highly 
flexible regime where workers and employers can bargain depending on their actual 
power, and can expect very little legal enforcement.   
Would making the labour regulation more flexible achieve what its proponents 
promise? Hardly, it seems. The only sector where it could have real bite is the employee-
friendly regime, because it is not flexible already. However, the potential benefits need to 
be analyzed. The claim that labour flexibility would create jobs and increase output 
assumes that the demand for labour is quite elastic. These relevant economic sectors are 
quite capital intensive, however, with labour costs representing a small share of the total 
cost of production. When the share of labour costs—such as wages and labour 
protections—in the firm’s total costs is small, the labour demand tends to be inelastic. 
Under this scenario a decrease in labour costs, due to more flexible regulation, is unlikely 
to have a significant impact on job creation.168 
Even if cheaper labour costs create jobs in these industries, these may result in the 
significant deterioration of wages and working conditions. Given fixed capital costs and a 
small share of labour in total costs, lower wages and labour benefits may not guarantee 
higher overall productivity. Even if we were to see an increase in productivity, past 
productivity increases due to lowered wages does not confirm a link between higher 
productivity and job creation.169 We can only see this by analysing the employee-friendly 
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regime with the specific sector it regulates and looking at how the law operates in reality, 
not by treating it in the abstract. 
 
In the current debate, there is surprisingly little diagnosis of how labor regulation 
actually works and what a flexibility reform would mean for different economic sectors 
as well as for workers and employers in these different labor regimes. Labour regulation 
does not have to be the same for all sectors. Different economic sectors can have different 
forms of labour contracts. Labour regulation is not uniform on the books or in practice. 
Any labour reform should be part of a broader development strategy, taking into account 
the conditions of different economic sectors and the role they would play in the overall 
national strategy for competition and job creation.  
 
One final, crucial element of a labour flexibility reform concerns unions and 
unionized workers. Unions must be able to compete with one another, and workers 
should be empowered to participate in the governance of their unions and to challenge 
their leadership. For too long, the democratic aspirations of society have been suspended 
in the workplace. There is no reason why democratic life and the desire to experience 
meaningful participation and influence in society should stop at the firm’s door, where 
workers spend a significant part of their lives. Such a reform would require the 
disentanglement of the government from control over union’s existence, elections and 
governance – much like it has happened with political parties. Similarly, an independent 
body could be entrusted to register unions, monitor their internal elections and ensure 
electoral competition between them to gain majority control over collective agreements. 
If union life is to be democratic – and the unions are to be attractive again to society – 
there should be competition over union leadership. This requires elimination of re-
election or else term-limits. Furthermore, serious remedies must be available to workers 
to challenge their leaders when their interests have been affected. This does not mean 
dismantling all the elements of the collective bargaining system. Some, which enable 
workers to organize and help avert collective action problems, may be retained. But these 
rules, like the closed-shop and compulsory union fees, have been subverted for too long 
against the interest of workers. These mechanisms of collective bargaining would be 
worth preserving only if corporatist institutions can be reformed to foster independent 
unions and a vigorous workforce that makes leadership accountable.  
Conclusion  
In the current global economic conditions, labour law advocates find themselves on the 
defence. There are strong pressures worldwide to dismantle labour regulations and social 
security institutions. These regulations were introduced in the twentieth century as 
modern states stepped in to ensure a minimum floor of protections for workers and to 
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mediate conflict between labour and capital. Once seen as a sign of a modern and 
dynamic industrial economy, labour regulation is derided today as a rigid vestige of the 
past. The rallying cry for reform is “labour flexibility,” which is associated with all things 
positive of the new economy and proposes to cure the ills of unemployment, lack of 
competitiveness, and stagnant growth.  
 
Faced with the attack on labour regulation, advocates of social law resort to three 
powerful defences: identity and national pride, the historically progressive character of 
labour law and labour rights as constitutional or human rights. These powerful  
arguments may be potential antidotes to deregulatory pressures. Proffered strategically to 
resist labour flexibility reform, when deemed less desirable than the status quo, these 
arguments may have some instrumental value. I argue in this article, however, that they 
also have significant downsides. These arguments eschew an analysis of the 
consequences of existing labour regulation, and they fail to answer the flexibility 
critiques, even if they are unfounded. Additionally, these arguments make it harder to 
imagine alternative, progressive regulatory mechanisms to address workers’ concerns 
other than hanging on to the status quo.  
 
Analysing Mexican labour law’s traditional narrative, I have challenged claims of 
workers’ rights national originality and inherent progressiveness. I show that the 
emergence of workers’ rights and labour legislation in Mexico was the result of a truly 
international phenomenon, where foreign ideas and laws played an important role. 
Moreover, the constitutionalization of workers’ rights and subsequent labour legislation 
was more the result of a political compromise than the historical victory of a radical 
program. These challenges call for rethinking labour regulation, even to defend parts of 
it, by looking at its current effects rather than by invoking national myths that elude these 
questions, however dear these stories might be.  
 
In the present debate, the PRI has used the social law discourse, resorting to national 
pride and to labour regulation’s assumed progressiveness, to advance a bill that includes 
the flexibility recipes for employment contracts and preserves the worst aspects of 
corporatism in collective bargaining favouring old, official unions. This shows how 
malleable the social position can be and questions its association with a necessarily 
progressive political position. 
 
The insights from Mexico may be relevant for other countries where social advocates 
use similar identity-based arguments and equate labour regulation with necessarily 
progressive results. In Europe, advocates have used identity-based arguments to defend 
social regulation, including labour law, at the regional and the national levels. Regionally, 
advocates have attempted to constitutionalize social rights, arguing that they should be 
recognized as inherent part of European identity expressed in the notion of “Social 
Europe.” Their aim is to reshape European economic integration by introducing regional 
social values. Nationally, social advocates less keen on the regional project have used 
identity to defend domestic labour regulation and national welfare institutions against the 
inroads of unfettered market integration.  
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To some extent, these projects might be useful in resisting labour market 
deregulation. But by portraying existing labour regulation as the best alternative, they 
obscure its negative consequences and make it harder to think of different legal 
arrangements. At the EU level, the project of consitutionalising social rights has been 
successful, resulting in new treaty language and increasingly socially-oriented EU 
commission discourse. However, several ECJ cases and the EU’s response to the 
financial crisis make clear that social law is very capacious and can be co-opted by both 
the neoliberal market-integration project and the labour flexibility program. The 
constitutionalization of social rights, social advocates have painfully found out, does not 
necessarily lead to the results they foresaw. This highlights the political indeterminacy of 
social law discourse and the downsides of a strategy predicated on identity and 
constitutional rights.  
 
Domestically, the retrenchment to the national welfare state as a strategy to resist the 
EU integration project may also lose sight of problems within the existing social model. 
Additionally, it narrows the view to the national arena precisely at the time when vital 
questions of competition and distribution, between capital and labour and between 
different groups of workers, involve transnational rules and actors. The critique of the 
supposed national or regional identity arguments in social law seeks to broaden the scope 
to the transnational arena, thinking about collective solutions for workers in the face of 
regulatory competition. By doing this comparison, I do not mean to suggest that the 
situation in Mexico and Europe is the same or that the critiques in the Mexican context 
are simply transferable. Instead, I seek to illuminate important parallels in the arguments 
advanced by social advocates. The insights from the Mexican analysis may be suggestive 
of a broader phenomenon, perhaps one of progressive originalism running up against 
arguments of economic necessity.  
 
Using the Mexican case, I suggest that there is an opportunity to engage with the 
deregulatory agenda for labour flexibility in a more productive way. First, we need a 
more comprehensive diagnosis of how labour regulation takes hold in different economic 
sectors. I argue that there are at least three different regimes in operation, ranging from 
formality and effective enforcement, to loose enforcement to informality. By considering 
the relationship between these labour regimes and economic sectors, we can better 
imagine what the results of potential labour reform would be.  
 
In my view pro-labour advocates could challenge the assumptions of labour 
flexibility without needing to hang on to existing labour market regulation. They could 
appropriate the aspirations of flexibility to benefit workers, demanding more ambitious 
reforms that address firms’ outdated modes of production and management to create a 
more participatory and meaningful workplace. At the same time, pro-labour advocates 
can propose ending the dependency on permanent employment for basic entitlements 
such as health, childcare and retirement funds, moving toward a universal coverage 
system. This debate could be an opportunity to rethink legal mechanisms that empower 
workers under conditions of global economic competition, and to do it while being 
mindful of the effects on the country’s development prospects.  
